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In the recent past, several groups of members of Congress have chosen to live together as 
roommates in shared part-time homes. I investigate whether these residential relationships have 
an impact on the lawmakers’ rates of collaboration with one another. Theoretically, roommates 
will collaborate with one another more because of greater proximity, mutual self-interest, and 
altruism. This thesis tracks two case studies qualitatively and quantitatively, using news 
coverage, research interviews with former members of Congress, probit regression analysis, and 
a difference-in-differences quasi-experiment to find significant support for a substantial 
“roommate effect” independent of a range of controls including ideology and party. 
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1. Introduction – Why Study Residential Social Relationships 
Between Legislators? 
Washington is actually a lonely place. Millions of acquaintances, many people want 
something. But no friends. We're friends. (Tapper 2007) 
 
Introduction 
Sharing a home in the capital has been a practice among members of Congress since the 
nation’s founding, and it is well-known that residential environments can play host to meaningful 
policy discussions or even important legislative negotiations. In the nineteenth century, for 
example, a first-term congressman from Illinois named Abraham Lincoln listened to remarks 
from abolitionist Joshua Giddings at their shared boardinghouse (D. Rogers 1986), and the two 
ended up working together directly on anti-slavery legislation.1 He later served in Lincoln’s 
administration. This was not an isolated case; in fact, boardinghouses even came to manifest 
themselves as voting blocs in the early years of the republic (Young 1966). 
Residency in Washington has, of course, evolved greatly since Lincoln’s time. By the 
middle of the twentieth century, many members of Congress had instead made the Washington 
area their primary residence, bringing their families and putting down roots in neighborhoods 
like Georgetown or suburbs like Arlington. After the popularization of commuter air travel, the 
balance swung back toward maintaining one’s primary residence in one’s home district (Mann 
and Ornstein 2006, 169, 215), as the appearance of being “detached” from one’s community 
became a political liability (Kaiser 2013; e.g. Campanile 2011). Combined with expensive rents 
and a smattering of other reasons, this has led many members of Congress to sleep in their 
offices and given rise to renewed interest in congressional living arrangements, including the 
 
1 See Lincoln (1849) for primary source documentation, courtesy of the Library of Congress. 
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prospect of a congressional dormitory (Schwedel 2017; Cooper 2018). It has also inspired small 
groups of legislators to live together as part-time roommates in the capital, sharing rooms in a 
townhouse while their families remain in their districts. 
In the modern world, then, might living together significantly affect how members of 
Congress legislate? Informal relationships remain a critical form of political capital in 
Washington; it is quite possible, therefore, that cohabitation would lead to a significant increase 
in collaboration among those lawmakers who room together. Can that correlation be quantified, 
and can the specific causal mechanisms be identified? This thesis seeks to answer those 
questions using a case study approach, focusing on historical data associated with two different 
groups of congressional representatives who shared a residence communally. In a qualitative 
analysis consisting of analysis of news coverage and research interviews with former members 
of Congress, I find strong support for the prospect of a “roommate effect” and determine that 
roommate status is indeed likely to cause an increase in shared productivity among those 
legislators. In a quantitative analysis that uses cosponsorship data as a proxy for collaboration, I 
find that there is indeed a significant correlation between cohabitation and collaboration, to the 
tune of about two percentage points—a 20-25% increase—but a difference-in-difference-in-
difference analysis fails to conclusively resolve the question of causation using the imperfect 
data currently available. I therefore rely upon the qualitative analysis’s causal determinations, 
concluding that it is very plausible that at least a substantial portion of that quantitative finding is 
genuinely being caused by the information-sharing and interpersonal trust built during the 
cohabitation, with other portions being caused by unmeasured factors like self-selection along 
personality traits or other examples of homophily (c.f. McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 
2001). For instance, a part of this novel shared productivity has to be caused directly by the 
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roommate tie because a large measure of the cooperation takes place under circumstances that 
have no rival occasions for collaboration. In other words, there is no similar situation where 
legislators can regularly socialize and share information late at night as they prepare for the next 
day. These results are not necessarily representative of all possible roommate groups, as the 
roommates came together in a nonrandom way. As such, the policy implications are limited; 
however, it seems likely that similar groups would experience similar benefits with respect to 
productivity and collaboration. 
1.1 Hypothesis and Motivation 
I test two interrelated but distinct hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that legislators who 
cohabitate will collaborate with one another at a greater rate than they do with non-roommates 
who are otherwise similar. The second hypothesis is causal rather than correlational: it is that 
legislators’ sharing living space will cause increased legislative collaboration among the group, 
for instance by increasing information-sharing and interpersonal trust between those members of 
Congress.  
From a theoretical perspective, if increased collaboration in Congress can be linked to 
lawmakers’ sharing living space—specifically, if cohabitation induces collaboration—this paper 
could serve as a meaningful case study with which to inform ongoing discussions about political 
psychology. If living together does indeed improve legislative collaboration, and it can be traced 
to a particular causal mechanism, there are many political regarding the impact of something as 
simple as informal, unstructured time shared between legislators within theories about legislative 
strategy and political decision-making.  
From a more substantive policymaking perspective, a positive or negative answer to the 
central question of this paper will have an impact on recurring debates over congressional 
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housing and recent discussion about permanently digitizing aspects of Congress’s operations. 
Since the informal interactions that characterize cohabitation appear to significantly improve 
shared productivity, it may be worthwhile to encourage similar arrangements between other 
lawmakers. On the flip side, the importance of in-person interpersonal connections would imply 
that digitizing Congress will diminish productivity to a degree. Conversely, if there were no 
driving relationship between cohabitation and collaboration, proposals to digitize Congress may 
have been less harmful in certain ways than traditional wisdom would suggest, and encouraging 
more legislators to live together would have been unnecessary or even misguided.  
This paper focuses on trust and information-sharing as the mediums by which 
cohabitation might improve legislative collaboration. Specifically, since definitions of trust differ 
considerably across the literature, this paper considers a blend of three mechanisms that improve 
trust and collaboration among roommates in particular: simple proximity, rational “encapsulated 
interest” decisions, and social-psychological factors such as altruism. These causal mechanisms 
must be explored because physical proximity alone is not alone a direct cause for substantive 
collaboration. As for explanations rival to those under the “trust” umbrella, there are none that 
adequately satisfy the broad nature of this analysis and the particularities of the interpersonal 
relationships that characterize it. A simpler mechanism of greater information-sharing could 
certainly explain some collaboration, but it may not provide a full or robust explanation. After 
all, legislators receive large quantities of information all the time, in briefings, meetings, and 
hearings—the unique element here is instead the intimate circumstance in which the information 
can be shared, and the extensive time spent in that environment. Information-sharing will instead 
be subsumed as one of several ways that roommates engage in building and utilizing different 
manifestations of trust.  
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1.2 Literature Review – Causality: Trust, Proximity, Rational Interest, and Altruism 
Definitions of trust vary across the literature and across disciplines. Some economists 
distinguish between “calculative trust” and “personal trust,” with the former consisting of purely 
strategic economizing and the latter involving deeper, non-economic factors (Dunn 1990; 
Williamson 1993); the willingness to trust informs a decision whether or not to cooperate. In the 
field of project management, scholars have described trust as a willingness to be vulnerable to 
another party’s actions (Edkins and Smyth 2006). Many researchers also point out that people 
have different levels of generalized trust in others, as well as different moral motivations, and 
weigh those factors when measuring interpersonal trust (Leach and Sabatier 2005; Cook, Hardin, 
and Levi 2005). Some scholars view trust not merely as auxiliary to cooperation, but instead as a 
necessary threshold for cooperation to occur in the first place (Gambetta 2000). Such variety in 
definitions and applications requires that this thesis utilize more precise categories when 
describing behavior, though they all fall under the umbrella term “trust.” 
Leach and Sabatier (2005) use a helpful dichotomy to break down the above explanations 
of trust, among others, as they relate to political negotiation and collaboration. On the one hand, 
there are rational choice explanations of trust. The basic premise of such types of trust is that 
individual agents make calculated, evidence-based assessments as to whether or not another 
agent is “trustworthy,” and act accordingly. This calculation can be weighted to reflect any 
institutional rules (collective choice, monitoring, enforcement) that can constrain the agent’s 
actions, as well as other weights like the individual’s level of generalized trust in other people. 
The authors find that small groups that are stable over time—as well as groups that have more 
substantial surveillance and little anonymity—are the most conducive environment for rational 
choice trust. While they did not apply this frame to a lawmaker-roommate scenario, one can 
easily see the very helpful parallels for analysis: roommates are a small and stable group with 
Siegal 8 
some structural enforcement components (i.e. having to face on a daily basis those whom you 
might wrong), and they can frequently “surveil” each other. Other empirical analysis also 
reinforces the suggestion that the medium of frequent face-to-face communication, too, is 
particularly conducive to cooperation, for a number of reasons (Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 
1994).  
On the other hand, as Leach and Sabatier lay out, are explanations involving social 
psychology. In this model, trust derives from feelings about procedural legitimacy, the impacts 
of cognitive biases and heuristics, and synergistic collaboration rather than zero-sum horse-
trading. Here, the principal “foundation of trust” is an alignment of core policy beliefs, which are 
heuristic shortcuts that legislator A uses to determine whether collaboration with legislator B is 
at all possible. Unlike pure rational choice, though, there are elements like goodwill and social 
norms that influence the decision to trust and collaborate. As one might expect, scholars have 
found factors like friendship to be important influencers of behavior (c.f. Arnold, Deen, and 
Patterson 2000; Blum 2009; Caldeira and Patterson 1987). Another implication of this in the 
literature is that beliefs will converge over time as trust is built (Leach and Sabatier 2005; 
Sabatier and Zafonte 2001). It is difficult to believe that a small group of roommates would not 
experience some social psychological influences, given the intimacy of that relationship. Given 
these circumstances, the way this paper will categorize and assess this kind of behavior is under 
the descriptor “altruism toward roommates,” a model suggesting that an altruistic roommate feels 
that they receive a boost to their own well-being from helping a roommate. The relevant 
application in this thesis would be investigating whether a legislator’s altruism is directed 
disproportionately to their roommates relative to non-roommates. If that were the case, then it 
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would be plausible that cohabitating has augmented the bundle of social psychological 
phenomena categorized as altruism, thereby increasing collaboration. 
Borrowing from Leach and Sabatier’s dichotomy, social psychological explanations 
would have to be examined against a well-defined rational self-interest model. Russell Hardin 
(2002) proposes an “encapsulated interest” trust, where legislator A believes that legislator B 
will incorporate A’s own interests into B’s actions as long as A knows that B is interested in 
continuing to gain from their relationship in the long term. This enhances and facilitates 
cooperation between them, as the mutual self-interest means that A feels confident enough to be 
vulnerable to defection from B, which they know is unlikely. The behavior is purely rational, as 
there is not an element of goodwill or enforcement by social norms; Hardin uses the 
machinations between crooked dealings in Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov as an 
example. When B no longer believes that B’s interests will be served by a continued relationship 
with A, B will defect, and vice versa. It is also important to note that each assessment of trust is 
delimited with respect to a particular matter at hand. That is, A must always trust B with respect 
to Matter X or Matter Y. There is no guarantee that A will trust B on Matter Y even if they trust 
them on Matter X (c.f. Hardin 2001; Cook, Hardin, and Levi 2005, 2). In this way it is perhaps 
better described as a model of “confidence” rather than “trust,” in common parlance (Tonkiss 
and Passey 1999, 258–61). The encapsulated choice model will thus serve as a rational-choice 
baseline: anything beyond its standard is likely a social-psychological influence as opposed to a 
purely rational one. For one particular example, some scholars have discovered a “betrayal 
aversion,” a behavioral quirk where humans are less likely to engage in cooperation when the 
risk of loss derives from betrayal by another actor rather than simple bad luck, even when the 
Siegal 10 
magnitude of the risk is the same (Bohnet et al. 2008). This would depress the pure rational 
choice behavior I might otherwise expect. 
Altruism, meanwhile, describes pro-social behavior that could not be described by 
material self-interest alone; though precise definitions vary, the fundamental principle is that 
altruistic behavior benefits others at the expense of the altruist. In the congressional roommate 
scenario, this might be represented as the sacrifice of personal political gains (or the potential 
thereof)—or even simply an opportunity cost of time and energy that could be spent advancing 
personal causes instead—in order to benefit one’s roommates. In other words, it is non-
economizing behavior that intentionally benefits others rather than the altruist. This is a feature 
of human decision-making: Blum (2009), for example, suggests that friendship brings out 
“altruistic emotions” that justify partiality in one’s behavior. There are a number of 
environmental factors that may adjust the manifestation of altruism. Simon (1993) finds that 
bounded rationality and self-identification with a group or organization can stimulate forms of 
altruistic behavior. One might choose to label this “loyalty” rather than altruism, but I shall 
consider it under the umbrella of altruism for the sake of comprehensibility. Altruism also varies 
with beliefs, preferences, and the societal expectations thereof; Tabellini (2008) and 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2009) find that societies with stronger generalized morality and pro-social 
tendencies are more likely to engage in altruistic or trusting behavior (c.f. Berggren and 
Bjørnskov 2017). In this way, altruism is associated with both generalized trust as well as 
personal relationships; I will focus primarily on the latter in this analysis. 
Finally, simple physical proximity itself can produce a marginal increase in collaboration, 
which needs to be controlled for relative to an explanation about trust. One will utilize an easily 
accessible resource more quickly than one that requires a laborious search. However, by making 
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contact more frequent and increasing the rate of information-sharing, proximity also fuels other 
influences like friendship and rational self-interest. Literature on the subject of proximity-
induced collaboration is mixed. David Truman (1956, 1024) suggests that personal friendships as 
well as more frequent contact in state party delegations, legislative committees, and even the 
“proximity of offices or residences in Washington” provided voting cues to legislators. Caldeira 
and Patterson (1987) find that physical proximity inside and outside of the legislative chamber is 
likely to stimulate the development of friendship, and with it, trust and collaboration. Masket 
(2008) finds that deskmates in the California legislature are more likely to vote together, 
abstracted from partisanship. Saia (2018) finds that Icelandic legislators’ speech and voting 
behaviors are affected by the legislators seated near them, with the seating assignments allotted 
at random; he also complements that analysis by finding a correlation between seating location 
and legislative behavior during the 29th Congress, where the opportunity to choose seats was 
given out by a lottery. Similarly, while he does not make bold causal claims, Dietrich (2020) 
uses motion tracking on C-SPAN footage to find that cross-partisan mingling in the chamber can 
predict the partisanship of future votes, even with past votes used as controls.  
On the other hand, Rogowski and Sinclair (2012) found a simple correlation between 
office proximity and voting or cosponsorship behavior to be made insignificant after controlling 
for network endogeneity and homophily (an affinity for shared characteristics, including race, 
gender, and/or personality), undermining the causal inferences drawn by prior research. 
However, their confidence intervals are quite large. Shalizi and Thomas (2011) pose similar 
warnings about drawing causality from observational social network studies, as homophily-
driven self-selection is typically confounded with genuine social influences. Nevertheless, 
Harmon et al. (2019) address many of the above studies and clarify this literature by using 
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instrumental variable analysis to determine that there is indeed likely a causal impact from 
proximity, studying alphabetical seat assignments in the European Parliament (see also Matthews 
and Stimson 1975, 53). With cautious optimism, then, it seems likely that simple proximity 
exerts at least some kind of influence on legislative behavior, both on its own as well as by 
augmenting other mechanisms like friendship and information-sharing.  
Ultimately, none of the three above influences—categorized as rational interest, altruism, 
and proximity—are entirely sufficient explanatory devices alone. For example, Hardin’s 
encapsulated interest trust best serves discussions where game-theoretic analysis is concrete, 
with clear penalties and clear gains. The costs and benefits of collaborating with another 
policymaker on legislation, though, are usually amorphous and unclear. Any altruism is also not 
easily quantifiable in this situation. Similarly, proximity presents difficulties in this instance, 
because the frequencies with which cohabitating legislators encounter each other at home is not 
measurable; also, proximity spurs the sharing of information, which can augment rational interest 
decisions or spark altruistic friendships. Nevertheless, these categories of behavior are useful 
illustrations of the main types of causal drivers one would expect in this scenario, and they will 
be the focus of the causality discussion. 
At the end of the day, a robust and concise definition of trust is hard for scholars to pin 
down because it is studied within many different disciplines, occurs at many different levels of 
analysis (individual, institutional, generalized), it appears in multiple places in the causal chain 
(it can be a cause, an effect, and a moderator), and it is dynamic across time (Rousseau et al. 
1998; Smyth, Gustafsson, and Ganskau 2010; Putnam 2000). Therefore, this paper follows other 
literature in considering trust broadly and multidimensionally (Braithwaite 2003; Leach and 
Sabatier 2005). In this case, will span many of the definitions listed above, agglomerated under 
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the shorthand “trust” but with reference to specific phenomena when appropriate, in particular 
the encapsulated interest model and the potential influences of altruism.  
Such breadth is useful in this instance because trust between roommates involves both 
interpersonal factors, like socializing, as well as structural enforcement influences, like rent 
payments and the inevitability of face-to-face confrontations. Nevertheless, some models of trust 
are likely to be more applicable than others, especially the encapsulated interest model, where 
relationships are accommodated and prioritized in instances of iterated collaboration among 
agents. While the trust literature has not yet substantively engaged the social situation of 
lawmakers who are roommates in particular, there is no reason to suggest that it cannot be 
applied to such a scenario successfully. 
 It is important to note that political affiliations can impact social decisions, including 
one’s choice of roommates. Shafranek (2019), using conjoint analysis on a sample of college 
students, finds that partisanship (isolated from other characteristics and traits typically correlated 
with partisanship) could have a strong influence upon collegiate roommate considerations, 
particularly among people with strong political identities. The same effect is doubtless applicable 
to congressional living arrangements, and likely much greater in magnitude. For reasons that are 
perhaps obvious, most members of Congress choose to not share living space with members of 
the other party: there is a risk of information leaks, stress during tense party conflicts, and strong 
differences in fundamental beliefs (c.f. Pew Research Center 2017; Taylor 2017; Groenendyk 
2018). Smaller but non-negligible versions of these disincentives also exist the further apart the 
legislators are ideologically, even within the same party (c.f. Zack Budryk 2021). Meanwhile, 
shared characteristics including ideology and background tend to stimulate social connections 
and outreach (e.g Block and Grund 2014). 
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 Thus, it is possible both for (1) people who become roommates to collaborate more as a 
result and (2) people to select roommates with whom they are already more likely to collaborate. 
This presents a substantial causality problem, which will have to be monitored carefully.  As was 
already discussed with respect to prior findings regarding proximity, it is in fact quite common 
for observational studies of social networks—like this one—to encounter difficulties with 
causality due to the confounds of contagion and homophily, which have an effect of self-
selection (Shalizi and Thomas 2011). Frank and Xu (2020), writing for The Oxford Handbook of 
Social Networks, recommend that, in the absence of adequate randomization, researchers of 
interpersonal networks use longitudinal data combined with robust covariates and thorough 
research behind the mechanics of the network’s influence in order to draw causal conclusions. 
Accordingly, this thesis uses a difference-in-difference-in-differences examination of 
longitudinal data as well as an extensive qualitative investigation into the potential causal 
mechanisms. 
1.3 Literature Review – Cosponsorships and Legislative Collaboration 
 This portion of the literature review seeks to defend the selection of cosponsorships as a 
proxy for legislative collaboration by outlining their function and benefits, to acknowledge their 
limitations as a metric, to examine their relevance in a scenario involving legislator-roommates, 
and to explore supplementary alternatives for qualitative analysis. 
Generally, a bill in either chamber of Congress is only allowed to have one legislator 
listed as a sponsor, although there are some rare exceptions. If other members wish to indicate a 
level of strong support for a bill, they must sign on as cosponsors; meanwhile, a sponsor will 
seek out a substantial list of cosponsors to indicate that their bill is popular and passable. The 
strongest supporters among these are usually “original cosponsors,” a label which designates 
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those who were cosponsors at the time the bill was introduced. However, more cosponsors can 
be added as the bill changes and develops. Cosponsorships can also be withdrawn, but this is 
costlier: it requires action on the floor of the chamber (Oleszek 2018, 2019). There have been no 
limits on the number of possible cosponsors a bill may have in either chamber since 1979 
(Oleszek 2019), covering the full scope of this paper’s case studies.  
 Cosponsorships are a meaningful measure of support and assistance, albeit with limits. 
Their effect is clearly not negligible: sponsors remain intentional about undertaking the costs of 
circulating “Dear Colleague” letters to recruit cosponsors, and frequently attempt to reap the 
benefit of that work by highlighting the quantity and diversity of their bill’s cosponsors in floor 
debates (Campbell 1982). Indeed, seeking cosponsorships is regarded as the mark of an 
entrepreneurial legislator (Wawro 2001, 30). Wilson and Young (1997) note that 
cosponsorships—in particular those that signal large-scale bandwagoning or the support of topic 
experts—can have significant marginal effects at certain parts of the legislative process (namely, 
in getting a bill to be considered and reported to the floor by a committee), but that in general 
their impact is quite small. Other scholars have shown that cosponsorship patterns in Congress 
frequently flow over time from the extremists to the moderates, supporting the idea that 
cosponsorships are used for intralegislative signaling and coalition-building (D. Kessler and 
Krehbiel 1996; also c.f. R. K. Wilson and Young 1997).  
Finally, it should be noted that at certain thresholds cosponsorships can provide some 
direct material benefits to the sponsor in the chamber itself. Rarely, bill sponsors in the House 
will use or threaten to use the discharge petition, which forces their bill to the floor without going 
through the normal process of being reported from a committee; however, that requires 218 
signatures, so representatives have an incentive to prepare a coalition of over 218 cosponsorships 
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in that case (Krehbiel 1995). As of the 116th Congress, there is also a new “Consensus Calendar” 
in the House, designed to accelerate the passage of bills with over 290 cosponsors (Oleszek 
2019). 
 However, it should also be noted that cosponsorships are very “cheap” in terms of time, 
effort, and political capital, and are therefore an imperfect measure for strong support or 
commitment to a bill. For example, members have shared anecdotes about cosponsoring 
colleagues’ bills without reading them, just as a courtesy, and related that even if they end up 
disagreeing with the final bill, they will usually not bother to offend the sponsor by taking time 
on the floor to remove their name later on (Oleszek 2018). They are also not necessarily 
representative of members’ support across time. Researchers have even set aside a term for 
legislators that later take action against a bill for which they are cosponsors: “wafflers,” 
(Kirkland and Harden 2016; Krehbiel 1995). These are relatively small sources of error, but they 
are important to consider nonetheless. 
Though they may be “cheap,” they are of course not costless—otherwise all legislators 
would cosponsor all bills—so there are trade-offs that legislators must weigh, and thus there is 
ample material for rich analysis. One prominent older theory says that cosponsorships are useful 
for “position-taking”—that they are a particularly inexpensive way to demonstrate legislative 
productivity to constituents, since the legislator can claim credit if the bill passes without paying 
much of a price if it fails (Mayhew 1974). However, that theory has been complicated (c.f. Koger 
2003) by more recent empirical analysis: there are still some other significant variables at play, 
and political scientists have typically been able to glean important correlations and conclusions 
from cosponsorship data. Many are predictable. For example, Harward and Moffett (2010) find 
that senators are more likely to cosponsor salient bills when they have stronger ideologies, less 
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ideological difference from the bill in question, experience close elections, have expanded their 
social networks with other senators, face particular demands from constituents, and sponsor more 
bills overall. Unsurprisingly, researchers have also found that senators are more likely than 
members of the House to cosponsor bills from across the aisle (Rippere 2016). Political scientists 
have conducted studies at the state and federal levels that suggest an additional likelihood of 
cosponsorship as a result of the legislators’ sharing individual characteristics like race, gender, 
ethnicity, and committee membership (e.g. Bratton and Rouse 2011; Craig et al. 2015). In other 
studies, cosponsorship has also been positively associated with liberalism (Campbell 1982) and 
minority party status (Koger 2003), imperfectly associated with policy expertise (Gilligan and 
Krehbiel 1997), and negatively associated with seniority, especially leadership positions 
(Campbell 1982; Harward and Moffett 2010). There is also an intriguing variance with the party 
affiliation of the president (Koger 2003). Working with indirect mutual friends in the 
legislature—called “transitivity”—also appears to stimulate cosponsorship; reciprocity is a 
phenomenon as well (Bratton and Rouse 2011; Fowler 2006b), with “mutual” cosponsorships 
perhaps reflecting self-interest or reflecting a network of consistent altruistic partnerships (see 
also Battaglini, Patacchini, and Rainone 2019). This paper seeks to expand this available 
literature by testing another kind of interpersonal tie, roommate status. 
 Of course, there are more meaningful collaborative actions than cosponsorships that one 
might prefer to track. Members will collaborate legislatively by providing help with drafting 
bills, by whipping votes and building coalitions, by negotiating with interest group lobbyists, by 
speaking in favor of bills, and more (Kaiser 2013). Friendly legislators also assist one another 
with elections to caucus and committee leadership positions (Marsh 2002), or they might share 
fundraising lists and help with debate prep. However, most of these actions are informal, 
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inconsistently tracked, and frequently private, so they are at best anecdotal evidence that can be 
explored qualitatively. Among formally logged actions that could be analyzed quantitatively, 
cosponsorships are the best available option for data among other imperfect choices. Roll-call 
votes or floor debate, for example, would be an ineffectual sample for our purposes, as whether a 
bill comes up for a vote or debate is subject to many vagaries, most of which are outside of the 
individual sponsor’s control (Wawro 2001, 30). There is one further important limitation to the 
use of cosponsorship data, however: it is not able to account for any cross-chamber 
collaboration, as cosponsorships occur separately within the House and Senate. For this reason, 
one case study in the quantitative chapter has to be segmented over two periods of time. 
 
Remaining Structure 
The next chapter qualitatively examines formal and informal instances of collaboration across 
two selected case studies. Chapter 3 conducts quantitative analysis into cosponsorship behavior 
among roommates and non-roommates, and it finds a moderate and statistically significant 
disparity in that behavior, suggesting that there indeed exists a preference for one’s roommates. 
Chapter 4 discusses these two sets of conclusions jointly and lays out implications for policy 
decisions in the near future.  
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2 Qualitatively Tracing Residential Socializing: Two Case Studies 
I called up Marty and I said, "We're going to inaugurate Operation Saint Joseph,"—
(chuckling)—he's an Italian saint, just like Marty. I didn't know much about saints until 
I started rooming with Marty. (C-SPAN 1991) 
 
Introduction 
The roommate relationship is largely an informal one, and collaboration that derives from 
it is not delimited to any uniform set of actions. In the most substantive examples, roommates 
have built proposals together, workshopped each other’s flagship bills, co-written reports and 
congressional inquiries, and built coalitions supporting one another’s candidacies for leadership. 
They each have also connected the rest of their roommate cluster to their own personal resources, 
reminiscent of prior findings about “transitivity” (c.f. Bratton and Rouse 2011). As such, 
quantitatively logged actions like cosponsorships can only tell a part of the story when it comes 
to roommate collaboration, hence the importance of an additional qualitative analysis such as this 
one. 
In this chapter and the subsequent one, I select two case studies from Congress’s various 
groups of roommates, using the following criteria. To have strong samples with a lower risk of 
confounds, each shared residence must have been host to three or more legislator-residents, and 
it must have housed only residents who were themselves members of Congress. For ethical and 
security reasons, I consider only shared residences that have since disbanded, so as to protect 
legislators’ privacy, and only shared residences that intentionally entertained substantial press 
coverage over their existence, so that all information about them was already public. Finally, the 
groups must have existed relatively recently, so that the analysis reflects the workings of the 
modern Congress. These two case studies are the only two residences that fit these criteria, and 
they bring with them some limitations: for example, all the legislators in question are white men, 
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and race and gender are known to influence legislative collaboration (Craig et al. 2015). 
However, the two cases do represent legislators from different parties, which is particularly 
important since ideology and partisanship are the most significant drivers of collaborative 
behavior in Congress (Campbell 1982; Harward and Moffett 2010). 
The qualitative examination of each case study spans the duration of the group’s 
cohabitation, highlighting instances of inter-roommate collaboration and examining them for 
explanatory phenomena like proximity, information-sharing, rational interest and trust, or rival 
non-roommate-related explanations like coincidental policy focuses and committee assignments. 
It should be said at the outset that, given its non-systematic nature, this qualitative evidence 
demonstrates what can be, but empirically weak as to what is. In other words, this section is 
selective, with a dedicated focus on “positive” instances of collaboration; to draw more robust 
conclusions, it would have to account for all the other “negative” instances where there were 
opportunities for collaboration that were not taken up by the legislators in question. Given that 
each congressional session marks the introduction of thousands of bills and exponentially more 
informal opportunities for collaboration, it is impossible to qualitatively explore those “negative” 
non-collaborations in their full depth, though they will be discussed. Many factors affect 
collaboration, and the status of being roommates is obviously neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for legislators to collaborate. It may be the case that roommate status is one possible 
contributor (among many others) to some small level of marginally increased collaboration, but 
the scope of that increase would still vary wildly depending on the legislators’ ideologies, 
personalities, and levels of productivity. The probit regression analysis and difference-in-
difference investigation in the quantitative section is a more appropriate technique to achieve a 
well-grounded empirical conclusion to that particular question. 
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Instead, this qualitative section seeks to explore the heterogeneous instances of 
collaboration that go beyond a formal action like cosponsorship and may not be systematically 
tracked, and to use them as a lens for more insight into the potential scope of roommates’ 
cooperation in a legislature, as well as the mechanisms that may drive that cooperation. No 
qualitative summary along the particular organizing principle of roommate status yet exists, to 
my knowledge, so compiling and examining this resource is a useful task and one that may be 
helpful to later researchers. 
2.1 D Street House 
Introduction 
 For decades, a group of Democratic congressional roommates located in a townhouse on 
D Street (“the D Street house”) attracted reporters and sitcom pitches, and eventually did inspire 
a fictitious Amazon Prime Video TV series. Much of the coverage of their living arrangement is 
not particularly substantive, focusing on the members’ unglamorous lifestyle and gleefully 
recounting wisecracks and anecdotes befitting college living,2 for example: 
The last time Mr. Schumer tried to bake some cookies for a late-night snack, he couldn't 
figure out how to turn on the pilot light. His similarly flummoxed roommates ended up 
calling Hawaii, where the only stove distributor in the United States that was still open 
came to the aid of the hungry legislators. 
… 
Mr. Schumer recalls the time that he and a roommate, Representative Leon Panetta of 
California, chased particularly loud crickets up the stairs at 3 a.m. Both men were 
wearing their underwear. 
… 
Over the years, there were infestations of ants, flies, crickets, mice and even rats. ''The 
rats were enormous, like little cocker spaniels,'' said Mr. Durbin, who famously 
vanquished one of them with his golf club. 
… 
 
2 For the record, this author and his four college roommates resent the implication. We have no rats, just mice. 
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The roommates even banded together to play pranks on other legislators, once pushing 
the prized new sports car belonging to Representative Robert J. Mrazek, a Democrat from 
Long Island, to another street so he would think it had been stolen. (Marsh 2002) 
 
However, in each profile of the roommates, the reporters covering them made some other 
comments that, taken together, suggest the cohabitation generated a unique legislative 
phenomenon. 
The roommates made their political might felt in 1995 when Mr. Schumer, shocked by 
the cost of a box of Frosted Mini-Wheats, joined forces with a roommate at the time, 
Representative Sam Gejdenson of Connecticut, to issue a report calling for lower cereal 
prices. 
… 
But the roommates also supported one another, both politically and personally. In the 
early 1990's, Mr. Schumer and his housemates joined forces to help pass the Brady Gun 
Control Bill, one of Mr. Schumer's proudest accomplishments. When Mr. Panetta ran for 
chairman of the Budget Committee, his roommates lobbied for his election. (Marsh 2002) 
… 
Marty Russo of Illinois left after losing his seat in 1992, but not before talking out his 
proposal for a universal health-care bill with his roomies one midnight when he was not 
indulging his penchant for doing laundry. 
… 
It was here, too, that proposals for the alternative minimum income tax and clearer 
disclosure of credit-card interest rates were hatched… “Chuck always talked to us before 
he called Janet Reno and told her what to do on the crime bill.” (Purdum 1994) 
… 
The foursome quickly became a formidable force. They sat on different committees and 
shared information. (Parker 2014) 
 
The remainder of this section explores this portion of the roommates’ story in greater depth, 





 The D Street house was owned by Representative George Miller of California, who had 
originally purchased it in the 1970s as a family home. After his family relocated back to 
California for school, Miller began renting it out to fellow members of Congress. First came 
Marty Russo, a representative from Illinois, who stayed over during a snowstorm in 1982 and 
found the arrangement preferable to living alone. Next to join were Chuck Schumer and Leon 
Panetta, then congressmen from New York and California. The quartet would last until 1993, 
when Russo lost his seat and Panetta was appointed to a position in the Clinton administration. 
Their replacements were Sam Gejdenson, a representative from Connecticut, and Dick Durbin, 
another representative from Illinois. Durbin and Schumer rose to the rank of senator in 1997 and 
1999, respectively. Gejdenson lost his seat in 2000, and he was replaced by Bill Delahunt, a 
representative from Massachusetts. Delahunt retired in 2010, leaving just three remaining 
roommates when Miller decided to retire at the end of the 113th Congress, dissolving the 
roommate group permanently in late 2014 (Parker 2014). 
Figure 1 
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 Over this 32-year span, there were many specific instances of collaboration at a level 
beyond that of a simple, low-cost action like a cosponsorship. This section will explore each of 
the major instances. 
 
The Brady Bill 
 In 1989, Representative Schumer became the chair of the House Judiciary Committee’s 
subcommittee on crime; when the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act was re-introduced 
that year, therefore, he became a prominent supporter and an important stakeholder in the bill’s 
passage. Due to opposition from then-Speaker Thomas Foley (also a Democrat), however, the 
Majority Whip’s office was closed to the pro-Brady faction, so they had to whip votes 
themselves, with Schumer playing a significant role in managing that (S. Brady and McLoughlin 
2002).  
When there was a risk posed in 1991 by an NRA-backed “poison pill” amendment by 
Harley Staggers, Jr., of West Virginia, then, the burden of stopping it fell on Schumer and his 
allies. Notably, Schumer chose to lean on his roommate, among plenty of eligible moderate 
Democrats, asking Russo to take on a critical assignment: blocking the Staggers amendment by 
persuading Brady “no” votes to also vote Staggers down. He succeeded, and the Brady bill 
passed without the Staggers amendment (McGrory 1991). As Schumer announced at a 
celebration of the bill’s passage, they called the maneuver “Operation Saint Joseph,” after 
Marty’s heritage: 
And finally my roommate, Marty Russo. And Marty was—when we saw that Staggers 
was really gaining, and we were worried about it really winning, I called up Marty and I 
said, "We're going to inaugurate Operation Saint Joseph,"—(chuckling)—he's an Italian 
saint, just like Marty. I didn't know much about saints until I started rooming with Marty. 
But in any case, Operation Saint Joseph was to try and get pro-Staggers/anti-Brady 
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Democrats to vote anti-Staggers as well. And if you look at the results you saw what 
Operation Saint Joseph did. (C-SPAN 1991) 
 
While Russo was certainly a skilled legislator and negotiator, and a formidable whip (D. 
Rogers 1986), Schumer may have been uniquely predisposed to trust Russo with the task as a 
result of their relationship as roommates. As the simple model of proximity would suggest, 
coordination was doubtless easier given their regular encounters in the D Street house. One 
might add that shirking Schumer’s request would have been harder for Russo, given their 
frequent contact. Hardin’s (2002) encapsulated interest model would also suggest that 
collaboration between the two was moderated by rational self-interest. Russo was a gun control 
proponent (King and Weaver 1987), and regularly sponsored his own bills on the matter. The 
passage of landmark gun control legislation like the Brady Bill would have interested Russo 
regardless, just as Russo’s skill as a whip would have interested Schumer to an extent, whether 
or not they were living together.  
However, neither proximity nor self-interest alone is sufficient to guarantee that 
specifically Russo and Schumer would have worked together so closely. There is an argument to 
be made that roommate status aligns those two causal mechanisms; that mutual self-interest 
enables collaboration, and then proximity cinches the decision. In this way, perhaps living 
together just increases the frequency of certain fortunate coincidences that would produce more 
collaboration purely on the basis of rational interest. 
There appears to be more than self-interested calculus at play, though. For example, 
Schumer also references their easy familiarity in that passage, jesting about the title “Operation 
Saint Joseph.” It is likely that the trust-based friendship they built as roommates had an influence 
in their collaboration too. Theoretically, Schumer and Russo could have altruistically offered 
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their friend an opportunity for a victory, reflecting perhaps a redistribution rather than new 
productivity.  
This was an example of the analysis this chapter will conduct. As this analysis shows, it 
is difficult to make a definitive conclusion from the anecdotal evidence, but the most intuitive 
explanation seems to be that there was a blend of proximity, encapsulated interest, and altruism 
at play. Such an explanation cannot be modeled very easily, but it is perhaps the most realistic. 
Below is a summary of the other instances of collaboration the roommates undertook, followed 
by a more holistic analysis. 
     
The Four Horsemen 
 In general, the group of roommates, with diverse origins, legislative foci, and power 
bases, made a name for themselves as uniquely active and powerful for their various ages and 
ranks, which does not necessarily seem to be a coincidence. They leveraged each other’s 
resources; for example, Russo connected the quartet with Ways and Means power broker Dan 
Rostenkowski, who dubbed them his “four horsemen” and plugged them in with Speaker Tip 
O’Neill (D. Rogers 1986). Schumer, Russo, and Miller all lined up behind Panetta in his bid to 
become the Budget Committee chair, and their support was critical in his successful ascent to the 
position (Calmes 1987; Cloud 1987). Behind-the-scenes deal-making between Schumer and 
Panetta was central to resuscitating the Immigration Reform and Control Act (e.g. Shapiro 1984), 
most notably in working out a compromise to appease California growers concerned about their 
labor pool; Schumer “immediately turned to Panetta to represent agriculture’s interests,” pairing 
him with Rep. Howard Berman to settle provisions of the bill (Cohodas 1986b). As Panetta 
shared with me in an interview: 
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We worked through the whole program, with regard to work programs for farm labor and 
also employer issues, and Chuck would come in and out of that meeting because he was 
trying to get—he had no direct interest, obviously, in the agriculture issues, but he knew 
that if we didn't work out a compromise, there wouldn't be a bill, and so every once in a 
while he would engage just to make sure things were going in the right way. We 
ultimately arrived at a compromise, and that's what allowed that bill to pass. (Panetta 
2021) 
 
Without the compromises they struck, it is indeed unlikely that the bill would have achieved 
passage (Birnbaum 1987; Cohodas 1986a).  
They also relied on each other for informal—and honest—advice: Russo consulted his 
roommates about his universal health-care proposal, Schumer conferred with them on crime 
legislation, and Miller gave Schumer ideas about lowering credit card interest rates. Panetta, in 
his interview with me, added that “When somebody was running for something, the group 
became kind of the first place to test it out, as to whether it was halfway viable.” As Gejdenson 
told reporters visiting their home, it was an unusual environment because “you put your idea out 
there, and the first instinct is not to applaud you. You can run the traps pretty well here,” 
(Purdum 1994). Following up in an interview with me, Gejdenson highlighted that this was the 
most unusual aspect of their situation as roommates, relative to interactions with other members 
of Congress: their hours of uninterrupted time together to share thoughts and advice on what was 
going on in their lives and their work. As he put it,  
If you're ideologically in the same place, philosophically in the same place, it increases 
the likelihood of cooperation. You’ve got two or three hours at the end of each day—
where you don't have a thousand meetings going on, constituents coming in, press calls, 
and all the other things—where you actually talk about what you're working on… I think 
it just generally increases your productivity because, you know, most of these people—
there are obviously a lot of legislators who may slack off—but the people I know are 
workaholics. So having more time to collaborate and work on things just made you more 
productive. (Gejdenson 2021) 
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Delahunt agreed when interviewed, comparing the space to something of a “sanctuary,” though 
he cautioned that 
Yeah, but it was all—things were really, kind of more social discourse, you know, what's 
on TV, you know… So it was much more of that kind of relationship than, “Okay, let's 
sit down and discuss the details of legislation or policy.” That was obviously a lot of the 
discussion…We would not talk about bills, per se. It would be—I mean, occasionally it 
would come up, you know, “Are the votes there for that?” or “So-and-so is opposed.” But 
they were more—usually that would not occur. It would occur on occasion but the 
disagreements we had were, were minimal. And they were really predicated on 
friendships… You probably wouldn't have those conversations elsewhere, because if they 
were elsewhere, they would probably be more formal. And this was a relaxed 
environment where you had the advantage of trust, friendship, that you know will allow a 
very candid discussion about, you know, "What do you think about this? What do you 
think about that?" It wasn't done in any kind of a formal setting; it was done in a casual 
setting. (Delahunt 2021) 
 
In this way, being in a cluster of roommates seems to serve as a useful way to gather information 
about goings-on elsewhere in the Congress, about potential obstacles to the passage of one’s bill 
or initiative, and about the workings behind the different issues one’s roommates may focus on. 
Panetta agreed about the potency of their social ties: 
We would talk at the house or, you know, in the group, about whatever was happening 
legislatively or whatever was concerning us about the leadership, or what decisions that 
had been made or, schedules, et cetera, et cetera. Everything… And in the process of 
doing that, you know, particularly as it came to legislation—Russo was on the Ways and 
Means Committee, George was on Education and Labor, I think Interior as well if I 
recall, and Schumer was on Banking and Currency at that time… and I was on the 
Budget Committee, chair of the Budget Committee, and also on Agriculture so, you 
know, as bills—If there was a major bill that was coming to the floor, that we had 
concerns about or what-have-you, I mean, we would talk about how best to, you know—
what was the best strategy to try to deal with the bill, and, you know, what concerned us 
about the bill, whether there should be amendments, et cetera. And in some ways, it 
became kind of a lobbying group to try to persuade the leadership to, you know, to handle 
it in a certain way and I think sometimes we got, sometimes we got things done and 
sometimes we didn't, but it clearly became a vehicle for collaboration. (Panetta 2021) 
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Partially in jest, Panetta, who later served as the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 
went on to compare their social ties to an intelligence network. This is actually an apt illustrative 
device: suddenly, the roommates were able to access four streams of information every day, 
rather than just one.  
On a number of occasions, the collaboration would go beyond just talking: Schumer and 
Russo co-proposed an anti-drug and anti-crime government trust fund, for example (Elving 
1990), as well as an alternative minimum income tax proposal (Birnbaum 1985), parts of which 
were enacted in the 1986 tax reform bill. For another example, Miller’s nudge to look into credit 
card interest rates soon sparked a major legislative campaign on the issue from Schumer 
(Sternberg 1986). Miller, Schumer, and Russo also confronted House Armed Services chairman 
Les Aspin together to remedy wasteful defense spending (McGrory 1985), and collaborated on 
an amnesty proposal to collect back taxes (Dewar 1986). 
 Schumer and Gejdenson made waves in 1995 for a rather unique legislative campaign 
against high cereal prices, inspired directly by their apartment’s grocery shopping (Margasak 
1995).3 The two collaborated to release a report outlining corporate practices, the rise in cereal 
prices relative to other foods, and the presence of an oligopoly in the cereal market. The report 
asked for an antitrust investigation from the Justice Department, but they never got one, so they 
began releasing annual reports together and claimed a small victory after Post Cereal cut its 
prices in 1996, sparking cuts across the market (Salant 1997). 
Later on, Delahunt would serve as the House sponsor for a bill by newly-elected Senator 
Schumer to permit cameras in federal courtrooms (McCaffrey 2001). Durbin would also join 
Delahunt in proposing an Enron-inspired workers-rights bill (Tumulty 2002). Schumer also 
 
3 (None of them cooked, so cold cereal was a staple on D Street.) 
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revised legislation on fashion piracy previously put forward by Delahunt (Randall 2010). A 
Durbin-Miller alliance was central to a successful petition holding up Bush Treasury Secretary 
nominee John Snow in exchange for promises about corporate pension plan conversions 
(Tumulty 2003); the two also put forward proposals to improve student loans (Steiner 2006; D. 
Mitchell 2007), and teamed up to call for investigations into meat safety (Benton 2008) and into 
for-profit schools (Lewin 2010). Among others, Miller and Delahunt collaborated in responding 
to the Abramoff scandal (Shenon 2005), and on offshore drilling regulations, with Delahunt 
having reportedly “also raised the issue informally with his Capitol Hill housemate, California’s 
George Miller… the former chairman of the Natural Resources committee,” (Wangsness 2008). 
Delahunt, whose Massachusetts ties connected him with Barney Frank and Elizabeth Warren, 
also brought Warren’s idea for a financial product safety commission (eventually the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau) to the D Street group for support, and Durbin and Schumer soon 
introduced a Senate version of the legislation. This was not entirely a roommate effort alone, 
though, as Delahunt co-introduced the House version with Representative Brad Miller (D-NC) 
(Chesto 2009; Draut 2009; Delahunt 2021). The issue entered broader discussions on financial 
reform, and eventually did become part of the Dodd-Frank bill (c.f. Kaiser 2013). 
The roommates were not always on the same side of issues, and experienced 
disagreements. Panetta (2021) shared that Russo, a relatively conservative Democrat, and Miller, 
a California liberal, would occasionally oppose one another on certain matters. Roommate status 
also does not override something like the interests of their home districts: Gejdenson shared an 
example when he worked against Durbin and Schumer on import tariffs that were lower 
depending on the degree to which processing was done in America, because Gejdenson’s district 
had an important mill processing raw wool while suit manufacturers in New York and Illinois 
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would have benefitted from importing processed wool at a cheaper rate (Gejdenson 2021). 
Finally, though they moved out in late 2014, the friendship Schumer and Durbin had built as 
roommates did not stop them from vying against one another for Senate party leadership 
positions in 2015. Nevertheless, it moderated the tense competition between the two, with both 
pledging “not to let this dispute ruin their decades of friendship” (Kane 2015a). 
  
Analysis 
 These instances of collaboration are varied in scope, and they cover most informal and 
formal aspects of the legislative process. On the one hand, there are simple, low-cost interactions 
that seem to be sparked by ease of access and familiarity, like the late-night chats about 
legislative proposals, Schumer’s turn to Panetta during the immigration negotiations, and 
Miller’s suggestion about credit card reform. One could argue that proximity, encapsulated 
interest, and altruism are all viable mechanisms to explain these interactions. Indeed, 
Gejdenson’s quote about how “You can run the traps pretty well here” (Purdum 1994) suggests 
that collaboration was happening sincerely; in other words, as one might expect, that this was not 
just a world of material interests and quid pro quos. Panetta, Gejdenson, and Delahunt reinforced 
this point in their interviews with me, citing the friendship as the most important net gain from 
spending time in the D Street house. 
The same principles apply to the more substantive instances of collaboration listed, like 
the co-authoring of new proposals, assistance in leadership elections, coalition-building and 
expending political capital (e.g. the Brady Bill), and connections to outside resources (like 
Chairman Rostenkowski). The roommates all advanced their own political goals by sharing their 
networks and enabling one another’s achievements: at least in hindsight, then, rational interest 
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trust is equally as persuasive of an explanation as social psychology. This may not be surprising, 
as congressional productivity is traditionally tied to social ties anyway. As Panetta put it, 
It's all about human relationships, That's what makes the Congress work or not work. 
Those human relationships can be pretty basic, in terms of an ability to meet and to know 
somebody and understand what their problems are and what makes them tick. And, you 
know, the ability to kind of room together, it's a little bit like taking a permanent trip 
abroad. Those trips abroad help you understand each other. You get to understand, you 
get to know their families, you know them in a different situation than just on the House 
floor, and it does build human relationships. And, you know, I think anybody who lives 
with other roommates who are members of Congress—usually, those relationships 
become more than just the ability to kind of live together. They actually can become 
vehicles to get things done on legislation. (Panetta 2021) 
 
Putting the particular causal vehicle aside, the qualitative evidence does seem to indicate 
that living together did induce some level of additional collaboration among these congressional 
roommates beyond just sharing information, too. As Gejdenson and Delahunt mentioned, being 
roommates essentially unlocked a new period of time for informal productivity, as they could 
spend late-night hours chatting or strategizing with their other knowledgeable roommates about 
the various issues of the day. The most illustrative example from this section may be Gejdenson 
and Schumer’s yearslong war against cereal prices, where every component of the cooperation—
from the topic to the partnership—seem to have derived directly from their living arrangements.  
 Of course, it is also the case that not all four roommates joined in on every initiative 
together; clearly, there is a complicated nest of preferences behind legislative decisions, and 
being roommates can only ever be one facet of that larger picture. Naturally, there are rival 
explanations that could explain some points of collaboration. Most of the roommates came from 
safe blue districts (c.f. Harward and Moffett 2010), with the exception of Sam Gejdenson; they 
also broadly agreed on most liberal policy positions (Delahunt 2021; Gejdenson 2021). 
Ideological agreement and similar district composition are two of the most predictive indicators 
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of legislative collaboration (Campbell 1982; Harward and Moffett 2010). On the occasions that 
they had significant disagreements, these were also produced by political differences, for 
example those between Russo and Miller. 
Similarly, by the end of the D Street house’s tenure, most of its members were fairly 
senior in Democratic leadership, and they would have been expected to work together as party 
leaders on large projects. For example, Durbin and Miller featured prominently in the effort to 
extract promises on pension plans from Treasury nominee John Snow, but they were not alone—
they led the petition alongside Senators Sanders and Harkin, and eventually were supported by 
over 200 members of Congress. Durbin was the new Democratic Whip at the time, and Miller 
was the senior Democrat on the House Committee on Education and Labor, so they both already 
had natural positions at the fore of that particular initiative. 
Nevertheless, the qualitative evidence available does seem to support the idea that living 
together enables and encourages cooperation in ways not captured by either above rival 
explanation. The most convincing example is the high degree of “background” cooperation 
happening through information-sharing, followed by the substantial collaborations undertaken on 
committee and leadership elections, cereal prices and the Brady Bill. In all cases, the causal 
mechanism appears to be a mixture of encapsulated interest, altruism, and simple proximity. It is 
also important to note that this increased collaboration appears to be conditional; for the 
collaboration to occur, according to interviews with former D Street roommates, there needed to 
be basic ideological compatibility on the issue as well as compatibility based on state or district 
interests. Additionally, collaboration was much more likely to occur on issues where the 
roommates shared a legislative focus (Delahunt 2021; Gejdenson 2021). 
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2.2 The Shimkus House 
Introduction 
More recently, a group of Republican congressmen in a group residence in southwestern 
Washington received some publicity of their own. Hosted by Rep. John Shimkus in a townhouse 
that could fit up to four roommates, the group shared similar convivial stories to interested 
reporters, although the coverage was sparser than that of the house on D Street. Legislation was 
again not a direct, structured focus of those conversations. Roommates cited other informal 
perks: Rep. Gresham Barrett appreciated the accountability the arrangement provided, for 
example (A. Mitchell 2012). Rep. Erik Paulsen called the group his best friends, sharing that 
We usually carpool in. Shimkus drives. He sends an email every night for the time in the 
morning. It's like being in college again. They're great, and the nice thing is they're all 
family guys, and so at night we'll all tell what's going on with our families.” (Semnani 
2011)  
 
Indeed, by and large, the press coverage follows the D Street archetype, gleefully sharing 
anecdotes of fraternity-style living while parenthetically suggesting a level of collaborative 
engagement on legislation and politics:  
They subsisted on beef jerky, Dairy Queen and popcorn; left piles of dirty clothes on the 
floor; and conducted sensitive legislative negotiations from a beat-up faux leather couch 
held together by duct tape. (Bade and Cheney 2018) 
… 
Their shared politics help: Policy discussions tend to creep up amid viewings of the 
western movie “Tombstone” or of endless sports coverage on ESPN, Mr. Shimkus said. 
(K. Rogers 2017) 
 
Given the apparent parallels with the Democratic roommates, these Republicans are an 
ideal case study to further examine aspects of informal legislative collaboration in a wider group 
independent of party affiliation or ideology. This section will again focus on qualitative 
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evidence, in an effort to inform the more rigorous but more descriptively limited empirical 
investigation in the following chapter.  
 
Background 
Shimkus purchased the home in 2002 and was initially joined by Reps. Kevin Brady of 
Texas and Mark Kennedy of Minnesota (Eder 2002). Reps. John Sullivan of Oklahoma and 
Gresham Barrett of South Carolina were members of the group for short stints in the early years 
(Branch-Brioso 2004; A. Mitchell 2012). The longest lasting combination of roommates 
consisted of Shimkus, Brady, Erik Paulsen (R-MN), and Steve Scalise (R-LA), who were 
together for a decade. 
Figure 2 
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The group also made some waves after a Food Network-themed goodbye dinner montage 
they put together for outgoing roommate Erik Paulsen, who had lost his re-election bid (Gray 
2019). He was replaced by fellow Minnesota Rep. Pete Stauber in the 116th Congress. Finally, 
with John Shimkus’s retirement at the end of that session, they split up in 2021. 
 
Instances of Legislative Collaboration 
 The instances of collaboration between these roommates are similar in form to those of 
the house on D Street, but perhaps more conventional. Sullivan was an original cosponsor of a 
bill by Brady that would have exculpated law enforcement officers from certain mandatory 
minimums, for example; Barrett later joined as well (Ranjan 2008). Sullivan and Brady were also 
two of four main proponents of a natural gas bill in 2011, shortly after Sullivan had moved out 
(Singh 2011). However, the primary impetus for the bill came from external influence by 
financier T. Boone Pickens, so the roommates’ role in shaping the legislation together may have 
been limited.  
 Similarly, Shimkus was one of three original cosponsors for a bill Paulsen sponsored 
providing for accelerated access to early-stage devices and procedures for seniors on Medicare 
who are willing to pay out of pocket for them. (Hollis 2015); the two also were part of a small 
group of original cosponsors for tax credits for clinical research (Durkin 2015). More informally, 
Commerce Committee members Shimkus and Scalise also bandied around the idea of rewriting 
the 1996 Telecommunications Act to suit modern technology. (Capitol Hill 2016; McCabe 
2016). Shimkus even cited his relationship with Scalise on the House floor, saying  
In fact, I did mention in my opening statement President Obama talking about a new, 
green—moving on a carbon bill would include opening up more OCS. I mean that was a 
week before this disaster happened. So do you think—and I rely a lot on my friend and 
colleague and roommate, Steve Scalise, on some information on Gulf issues. Is a 
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moratorium an appropriate response, stopping operating wells that are, you know, 
operating in line right now? Is that a proper response? I understand doing research on the 
disaster, but a moratorium, Secretary Norton? (Shimkus 2010)   
 
The foursome was also collectively nominated to collect NRCC dues in 2014. They made it a 
competition—the loser had to do housework. They exceeded expectations and raised over $25 
million (Livingston 2014; R. Wilson 2014). 
 Perhaps the most productive committee partnership between the roommates was between 
Brady and Paulsen on Ways and Means. Brady, who became chair, made Paulsen’s Protect 
Medical Innovation Act part of a jobs package passed by the House in 2014 (K. Brady 2014). 
They also collaborated closely on an R&D tax credit (Viana 2011), a medical device excise tax 
moratorium (Zach Budryk 2018), and the larger tax reform proposals in the 115th Congress 
(Coolican 2017). How much of this collaboration was sparked by their status as roommates or by 
their being on the same committee is difficult to determine, though. In an interview with me, 
Paulsen agreed that there appeared to be a mix of both factors: 
Yeah, probably. And I think that's just because we were on the same committee, right. It 
just sort of lined up that way. We were also probably the two that spent the most time in 
the townhome in front of the TV set, doing stuff. And so, yeah, we would always talk 
about what's coming up in committee, you know, so that was an easy connection for us. 
(Paulsen 2021) 
 
Paulsen shared that he was able to discuss issues in his portfolio with Brady and the other 
roommates, like medical technology, and that they were able to build an awareness of the others’ 
state issues by conversing with one another and even visiting one another’s states. Brady visited 
Minnesota, for example, and Paulsen visiting a drilling platform off the coast of Louisiana with 
Scalise (Paulsen 2021). 
 The two roommates to most visibly collaborate were Brady and Scalise after they rose to 
the ranks of Ways and Means chair and Majority Whip, senior positions in House GOP 
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leadership. In particular, they collaborated on new healthcare tax credits and other tax plans 
(Schillinger and Aronson 2016), and co-wrote op-eds in USA Today and The Hill on the estate 
tax and the USMCA trade agreement, eventually working together to pass a repeal of the estate 
tax in the House (Baker 2015; K. Brady and Scalise 2015, 2019).  
 Indeed, in a close parallel to the D Street group, the roommates frequently leveraged each 
other’s aid to achieve new positions on committees and in leadership. Paulsen shared that he 
received advice on running the Joint Economic Committee from Brady, his roommate and the 
former chairman:  
They would help navigate those kind of things, because 1) they had experience doing it, 
and 2) they really wanted me to be successful in my goal, whatever it was… Actually, for 
Kevin Brady, he and I were particularly close because he was a chairman of the Joint 
Economic Committee. I got on that committee, and then I became chairman of that 
committee, and so… he was able to give me some really good insight about how to sort 
of structure the committee: you know, some good issues to focus on that might be well 
received on broad audience-level of economics. (Paulsen 2021) 
 
Scalise supported Shimkus’s failed bid for the chairmanship of the Energy and Commerce 
Committee (Bade 2016), for example. Notably, Scalise and Brady were a powerful alliance 
against John Boehner as they contested his vision for the GOP in 2014; the two rose together in 
concert, with Brady backing Scalise for Majority Whip and Scalise backing Brady for House 
Ways and Means in turn (Alberta 2014a, 2014b; Costa 2014). Most surprisingly, Shimkus also 
supported Scalise in his bid to become whip, despite the fact that a fellow Illinoisan, Peter 
Roskam, was a serious contender in the three-way election. This even deprived his home state of 
any representation in House leadership. Ideology was likely not a major issue, either—Shimkus, 
Roskam, and Scalise were all members of the right-wing Republican Study Committee (Alberta 
2014b; Sweet 2014). It is therefore possible that the roommate tie played a surprisingly potent 
role here.  
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 This is not to imply that the roommates were never crossways on issues. For example, in 
another example of incompatibility between state and district interests, Shimkus and Scalise 
wound up on opposing sides of a “gang of four” tasked with negotiating a federal biofuels 
mandate (Harder 2013). They also had significant disagreements on the Trump presidency, with 
Brady and Scalise supporting him and Shimkus and Paulsen denouncing him. There were even 
simple communications misfires: Shimkus and Scalise once planned competing trips for the 




 For one reason or another, there is less documentation about the residential relationship 
these Republicans had and the impact it may have had on their legislating. Perhaps they just had 
less contact with the media, perhaps reporters were less interested in the second “frat house” than 
the first, or perhaps there was just less occurring to report on. Even if there were less 
collaboration happening, that might not be because they were less inclined to do so with one 
another; prior literature has suggested that conservatism and cosponsorship are weakly 
negatively correlated, for example (Campbell 1982), positing that activism is generally 
associated with liberalism. If anything, this group spent more time together—baseball practices, 
carpooling to work with Shimkus—and, in light of Scalise’s shooting, successfully endured more 
collective trauma than the D Street roommates, so social-psychological influences may be even 
stronger among these legislators. Indeed, Paulsen, like the D Street roommates, cited the 
roommates’ personal friendships as often the important benefit and the most important motivator 
when it came to assisting one another: 
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I would say it was a huge value in increasing collaboration because, when you're 
spending time with people socially, and you're getting to know them and their families, 
and you're becoming friends, you're more apt to want to help each other to give advice to 
offer insight. You learn about which other colleagues are active on certain pieces of 
legislation or bills and you kind of share those little, “Oh, you may want to talk to so-and-
so,” you know… I think the altruism—sort of, the friendship component, was the most 
valuable because genuinely you find your roommates want to help you. (Paulsen 2021) 
 
Since the fundamental principles of the collaboration occurring do seem to be similar to that of 
the D Street house, it is reasonable to continue under the assumption that their behavior will be 
roughly comparable and can be explained using the same schema.  
The encapsulated interest model of trust seems to again be a reasonable way to analyze a 
portion of the roommates’ cooperative behavior. Brady, Paulsen, and Scalise, for example, 
appear to have engaged in teamwork with one another particularly frequently. Brady as Ways 
and Means chair accommodated Paulsen’s interests by incorporating his bills into tax packages; 
Paulsen, in turn, likely tailored those bills to Brady’s interests accordingly. Naturally, this 
benefitted both legislators’ self-interest, as they were able to claim legislative victories. In a more 
realpolitik scenario, Scalise and Brady had to carefully account for each other’s interests in their 
bid for House leadership. That their alliance has held successfully across the years, though, could 
require an explanation involving additional altruism within their relationship. Otherwise, 
according to Hardin’s encapsulated interest model, that would have to be a very stable alignment 
of mutual self-interest.  
A particularly dramatic example is John Shimkus’s choosing to support Scalise over 
Roskam in the majority whip election; it is unclear whether Shimkus was furthering or hindering 
his own material interests by supporting Scalise over an ideologically-aligned member of his 
own state’s delegation. Nevertheless, just as Durbin’s and Schumer’s priorities regarding their 
relationship moderated their competition for Senate leadership, Shimkus’s priority in accounting 
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for his roommate’s interest may have significantly influenced his decision. Given that Shimkus’s 
thought process is not observable and that the caucus election process occurs behind closed 
doors, it is impossible to rigorously determine whether that came from simple self-interest, 
greater altruism toward Scalise than Roskam, greater knowledge of Scalise than Roskam, or 
simply a belief that Scalise was the better candidate. 
 As was the case with D Street’s residents, it is important to also note the instances in 
which the Shimkus roommates did not collaborate. Naturally, not all of them participated in 
every initiative together, and roommate ties are only a small part of all legislative decision-
making. Again, rival explanations should be tested and weighed as much as possible. For 
example, ideology and district alignment are strong indicators of legislative collaboration 
(Campbell 1982; Harward and Moffett 2010). Strict ideological ties may have become weaker 
than those within D Street in this instance given the roommates’ later split on the Trump 
presidency. Similarly, while most the roommates came from safe red districts (c.f. Harward and 
Moffett 2010), Erik Paulsen did not, and he was one of the most prodigious collaborators within 
the group. These questions will also be tested empirically in the following chapter. 
 A more competitive rival explanation has to do with seniority and committee roles. Brady 
and Scalise were senior members of Republican leadership and therefore would have worked 
together regardless on large flagship GOP initiatives like tax cuts and healthcare reform. At a 
smaller scale, when advancing legislation, members of Congress work most closely with those 
colleagues who sit on their committees and subcommittees. This is true both because that is 
where the bulk of the work of writing and approving a bill occurs, and also because the members 
of that committee are likely to have relevant policy expertise (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1997). This 
could likely account for a large degree of Paulsen’s collaboration with Brady; again, given the 
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anecdotal evidence and the absence of a robust counterfactual, more rigorous analysis is 
impossible here. Committee membership is included in Chapter 3’s empirical analysis, and does 
tentatively indicate that, to an extent, roommate status and committee membership seem to act 
almost as partial substitutes when it comes to augmenting cooperation. This is intuitively 
persuasive and will be discussed further in Chapters 3 and 4. 
 None of these rival explanations seems to fully account for the degree to which the 
roommates accommodated and supported each other on their various ascents and initiatives. In 
particular, Shimkus’s support of Scalise in the whip election is a striking example. Roskam was 
both more senior than Scalise as the then-Chief Deputy Whip and had also worked closely with 
Shimkus on energy issues, even co-introducing a bill with him called the Energy VISION Act 
(Tankersley 2008), similar to the opportunities to collaborate that Shimkus and Scalise may have 
had on the Energy and Commerce Committee. Most importantly, Shimkus and Roskam were 
likely more aligned on both politics and strategy, evidenced later when both shied away from 
Donald Trump’s presidency; Scalise, meanwhile, embraced Trump. Nevertheless, Shimkus opted 
to support his roommate.  
 Therefore, the qualitative evidence available also seems to align with the expectations of 
a blend of encapsulated interest trust and altruism among the Shimkus roommates, prompted by 
their proximity and frequent interactions. Those factors do seem to have produced additional 
collaboration within that group, and to have enhanced the productivity of members of the group 
as they sought advice on moving their own initiatives forward. Again, this is only anecdotal 
support for the hypothesis that being roommates improves collaboration among these legislators. 
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2.3 Conclusions 
Across both case studies, it seems that the unique, defining characteristic of a roommate 
cluster is the duration of time spent together, and the informal, relaxed way in which that time is 
spent. This is essentially productive time that does not exist in the same way for other people; 
really, the only rival productive use for these late-night discussions might be something like 
reading or writing documents. In this sense, rather than primarily redistributing productivity, it 
seems that legislators living in roommate arrangements have made their late nights both more 
efficient and more enjoyable by sharing knowledge, advice, and interests with each other. 
The beneficial attribute cited by most congressional roommates is the expansion of one’s 
personal network, in terms of information gathering, receiving advice on procedure, and gaining 
new contacts to reach out to during the legislative process. In other words, in these shared 
residences, one legislator gains access to the resources normally available separately to four 
legislators—or at least partial access. As Panetta (2021) put it, the social ties they built 
“expanded their sphere of influence.” The fact that the Republican group managed to collect 
more NRCC dues than expected may also be an illustrative way to reflect the value of that 
expanded outreach. Essentially, this is a network externality for congressional productivity, 
where one legislator’s potential output is increased by the presence of roommates, and vice 
versa. Certainly, that network effect will not be consistent once greater quantities of cohabitating 
legislators are reached, but the qualitative evidence consistently indicates that at least this version 
—roommates in small groups—is quite useful. For reasons that remain unclear, that effect seems 
to be especially powerful with respect to committee and leadership elections. Paulsen makes a 
note that there could be a two-way causality on that issue, referring to Scalise’s whip election: 
You know, I think it was fairly easy to sort of lock up your roommates and get their 
support, right, or get insight of who else to talk to, or kind of what was happening in the 
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conference. And on the flip side, if someone else was running against him, they would 
kind of know okay, well, you know, Brady, Shimkus, and Paulsen are already with 
Scalise, because that's kind of how those things go, you end up just picking somebody—
but again that's that's a good example of actually helping folks, or giving advice on how 
to get on a certain committee. (Paulsen 2021) 
 
There thus appears to be a natural social ordering happening, where both the roommates 
recognize that they are going to support the friends they share a home with and others recognize 
that those roommates are more likely to stick together. If there were many more clusters of 
roommates, perhaps one would observe a phenomenon similar to the 19th-century boardinghouse 
voting blocs when it came to leadership elections like these. 
 Either way, from the above qualitative investigation, it seems like there are several 
necessary conditions that must be satisfied before substantive collaboration on legislation 
between roommates can occur: their districts must have compatible interests on the issue at hand, 
and they must have a degree of ideological compatibility. (Though Paulsen, a moderate 
Republican, signaled that he was open to similar arrangements with Democrats, at least in 
theory.) There is also an additional catalyzing element: legislators are more likely to collaborate 
if they share what Delahunt described as “issue portfolios,”—like a focus on foreign policy, 
financial services, or healthcare—or similarly, if they are members of the same committee or 
subcommittee. This further increase in collaboration ostensibly occurs both because they are 
mutually self-interested in the passage of that species of legislation and because they are more 
likely to be policy experts and thus better able to assist one another. Direct comparisons with 
committee membership and ideology will take place in the following chapter. 
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3 Quantitative Analysis: Empirical Tests, Case by Case 
If you had, let's just say, 80 other people all living together, four roommates each in 20 
houses, I can pretty much guarantee you'd have increased productivity and 
collaboration among those sets of roommates, that will expand the other sets of 
roommates… because you're going to get tips and advice on how to connect with other 
people. (Paulsen 2021) 
3.1 Introduction 
 Anecdotal evidence alone is insufficient for the purpose of reaching any clear conclusion 
about the significance and magnitude of the effect roommate relationships can have on 
legislative collaboration. This chapter therefore undertakes an empirical investigation—using 
cosponsorships as a quantitative proxy for collaboration—in order to more comprehensively 
understand the extent to which additional cooperation can be traced directly to a roommate tie, 
isolated from covariates like ideology, seniority, bill popularity, legislators’ productivity, and 
more. This section finds that roommate status is associated with an increase of approximately 
two percentage points4 in the likelihood of cosponsorship. This is a substantial finding given the 
overall low probability of cosponsoring any one particular piece of legislation: in these samples, 
within one’s own party, that probability is just over 8 percent,5 so the increase is equal in 
magnitude to about 20-25% of the average rate of cosponsorship; it is about half of the 
magnitude of the effect associated with being in the same party.6 However, the empirical 
 
4 Means of the effect range from 1.73 percentage points in the first D Street sample to 2.54 percentage points in the 
Shimkus sample. The second period of the D Street sample produced odd results that are unlikely to be externally 
valid.   
5 In the sample of D Street roommate bills, the likelihood of cosponsorship on average for non-roommate Democrats 
was 8.33%; for non-roommate Republicans in the Shimkus House sample, the average probability was 8.55%. 
6 In the first period of the D Street sample, it was equal to 54% of the magnitude of the effect associated with being a 
fellow Democrat, and it was 40.8% of the magnitude of the effect associated with being a fellow Republican in the 
Shimkus sample. The second period of the D Street sample produced odd results that are unlikely to be externally 
valid.   
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findings regarding causality are not as clear or convincing as those regarding correlation, as a 
difference-in-difference-in-differences quasi-experiment is unable to resolve the question of 
causality, albeit with an imperfect sample. 
 
Hypotheses 
 This paper’s overall hypothesis, stated in Chapter 1, is that legislators who cohabitate will 
undertake increased legislative collaboration together. As discussed in the literature review, 
cosponsorships are systematically tracked and serve as a fully observable metric of collaboration 
that have been shown to reflect social networks (Battaglini, Patacchini, and Rainone 2019; 
Bratton and Rouse 2011; Craig et al. 2015; Desmarais et al. 2015; Fowler 2006b). Therefore, the 
quantitative analysis utilizes cosponsorship decisions as a dependent variable in order to 
approximate the relative quantity of collaboration, tested against roommate status as an 
independent variable alongside a number of exogenous control variables like ideology, 
partisanship, committee membership, and more. Based on the goals of the paper and the extant 
information covered in Chapter 1’s literature review, I test a number of primary and secondary 
hypotheses.  
Primary H1: The roommate relationship is associated with increased rates of 
cosponsorship among roommates. 
Primary H2: The roommate relationship causes increased rates of cosponsorship among 
roommates. 
Secondary H3: Ideology is closely tied to rates of cosponsorship. 
Secondary H4: Legislators with higher productivity are associated with greater rates of 
cosponsorship. 
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Secondary H5: Seniority is negatively associated with rates of cosponsorship. 
Secondary H6: Minority party status is associated with greater rates of cosponsorship. 
H1 and H2, the primary hypotheses proposing a tie between roommate status and elevated rates 
of cosponsorship, are distinct in that H1 tests for an association while H2 tests for causality. In 
other words, H2 tests between three possibilities: roommate status induces collaboration; 
lawmakers are simply already more likely to collaborate with those whom they select as 
roommates; or there is a mix of both causal influences. H2 will be tested with a difference-in-
differences approach. For example, if the differences in cosponsorship behavior between 
roommate and non-roommate sponsors significantly increase when members of Congress join 
the shared residence after controlling for any other trends in cosponsorship behavior among the 
existing roommates, then it becomes quite likely that we can assign roommate status as the cause 
of increased collaboration with the roommates. If that marginal increase is positive but 
substantially smaller than, say, the average marginal increase of two percentage points, then 
there is likely a mix between a causal relation and a self-selection effect diluting it. Finally, if 
there is no significant divergence in behavior, a causal relation cannot be attributed 
quantitatively. Meanwhile, H1 will be tested for correlation using regular probit regression 
analysis. These are empirically falsifiable expressions of the two primary research questions 
being investigated in this paper: is roommate status correlated with elevated collaboration, and 
does roommate status cause elevated collaboration? 
 The secondary hypotheses, H3 through H6, are included as references to the results of 
other studies; their purpose is to signal the external validity of the primary results regarding H1 
and H2. Should any secondary hypothesis not be supported, this paper would effectively be 
contesting the conclusions of other, more comprehensive studies, and the real-world applicability 
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of these results would become spurious. H3 posits that ideology is closely tied to cosponsorship 
decisions, a standard finding in the literature. Specifically, greater cosponsorship rates are 
associated both with greater ideological extremity within the party in question as well as with 
greater ideological proximity between the legislator and the bill (Campbell 1982; Harward and 
Moffett 2010; D. Kessler and Krehbiel 1996; Koger 2003). A simple first-dimension 
NOMINATE score for the legislator is used as a proxy metric, which captures these effects 
jointly and satisfies its purpose as a control, although it does not isolate each sub-effect from the 
other perfectly. Nevertheless, both extremity and proximity can still be observed for trends at a 
finer grain within the graphical marginal effects analysis that I conduct. H4 is fairly 
straightforward: legislators have different levels of output, energy, and activity, so those with a 
greater output of sponsorships and cosponsorships are more likely to cosponsor any individual 
bill (Campbell 1982; Harward and Moffett 2010). In this case I account for the productivity of 
the bills’ sponsors by tracking how many bills they sponsored in the session, and for the 
productivity of the other legislators by tracking how many bills they cosponsored in the session. 
The latter is an imperfect metric as it is slightly circular; however, the average volume of 
cosponsorship is so high that the effect is negligible. H5 states that seniority (measured as terms 
served) is associated with decreased cosponsorship activity, a common finding in the literature 
(Campbell 1982; Harward and Moffett 2010; D. Kessler and Krehbiel 1996) that appears to 
result from more senior legislators conserving their political capital, since it is more valuable. 
Finally, H6 submits that legislators in the minority cosponsor bills at a higher rate, a curious 
finding in prior literature but one that does appear to be significant; cosponsorships become a 
more valuable tool for minority party members to define themselves and their philosophies, for 
example, since their own legislation is unlikely to pass (Koger 2003). 
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Data, Variables, and Methodology 
 This section uses cosponsorship data from the House of Representatives to quantitatively 
test for collaboration among the legislator-roommates from the two case studies examined 
qualitatively in the pervious chapter: the D Street and Shimkus groups. Because members of the 
D Street residence ascended to the Senate beginning in 1997, that data is partitioned into two 
periods: one before 1997, and one after 1997, where the use of only House data and 
inaccessibility of cross-chamber collaboration metrics artificially alters the visibility of 
collaboration and diminishes the quality of the sample. Those in John Shimkus’ residence, 
meanwhile, were exclusively members of the House, and therefore only one period is needed for 
them. Four probit regressions are run on each group, labeled R1-R4 each time to facilitate 
apples-to-apples comprehensibility. 
 The dataset primarily derives from a GovTrack crawl of THOMAS data from the 94th-
117th Congresses preserved online by James Fowler (2006b, 2006a; 2017). It is formatted as a 
record of every cosponsorship action taken on a bill, so the unit of analysis is bill-person-action. 
Selecting just House data, I expand this dataset to include all those who did not cosponsor the 
bills in question, so that there are consistently approximately 435 actions observed per bill,7 with 
thousands of bills being logged per session. In order to keep the focus on substantive 
 
7 This number is usually greater than 435 and varies with mid-session special elections. Since the finest-grained unit 
of time available is a congressional session, there are artificial “cosponsor = 0” values during the periods where the 
legislator in question may not have occupied the seat at the time of the bill’s introduction. This is a small source of 
error, but it may depress non-roommate cosponsorship averages slightly and thereby overaccentuate the difference 
between roommates and non-roommates. This is because the phenomenon disproportionately affects non-
roommates: only one roommate (Scalise) was elected via special election, and that rump term is excluded from his 
tenure as a roommate. 
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collaboration, I keep only bills designated as “important” by GovTrack. In the section of that 
data used here, spanning the 97th through the 114th Congresses, there are 42,117,175 bill-person-
action observations spanning 95,259 “important” bills. I exclude actions by non-voting delegates 
from the territories and the District of Columbia, as their cosponsorship behavior may differ 
from those of voting representatives. Sponsors of pieces of legislation are also removed from 
consideration related to that bill, as they are unable to simultaneously sponsor and cosponsor 
legislation; their inclusion would artificially lower their reported rate of cosponsorship. For each 
case study, bills are limited only to those sponsored by one of the roommates in question, in 
order to minimize unpredictable heterogeneity.8 
 Next, I merge into the dataset important control variables defined per bill, derived from 
the Congressional Bills Project (Adler and Wilkerson 2017). These include the number of 
cosponsorships each bill had, the name, party, and ideology of its sponsor (standardized across 
the dataset), as well as the sponsor’s majority or minority status. These also include a list of the 
committees to which the bill was referred, cut off by me at a maximum of six possible 
committees per bill to preserve the functionality of the data.9 As another proxy for sponsor 
productivity, I use the existing data to calculate how many “important” bills each sponsor had 
introduced per session, and duplicate it across that sponsor’s bills in a session as a new variable 
on each bill called totalsponsorships. 
 
8 This poses a risk of a selection effect. A fifth regression, R5, was run in each sample in the equivalent analysis, and 
incorporated all bills, not just those sponsored by a roommate. Roommate status still had an effect on the dependent 
cosponsor variable in R5, and was in fact larger and more significant than in R1-R4. However, as my dataset does 
not include bill ideology, it is likely that the increased margin is due mostly to the inclusion of ideologically 
divergent bills. R5 results are available in the appendix. 
9 This may nevertheless be a source of a very small amount of error. 
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 Next, I match legislator-specific ICPSR identifiers to legislators’ names using the public 
@unitedstates repository on GitHub (Mill, Tauberer, and Willis 2020) and the VoteView project 
by Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal (Poole and Rosenthal 2015). Committee membership data 
comes from data compiled by Charles Stewart III at MIT (Nelson 2005; Stewart and Woon 
2017), and is translated through a crosswalk provided by the Congressional Bills Project to 
match their identifiers. If the legislators’ committee memberships correspond to any of the 
committees into which a bill was introduced, they are given the identifier incommittee = 1. Note 
that this indicator does not necessarily mean that the particular legislator was actually in the 
same committee as the sponsor (though there is a strong correlation). The rationale for this 
variable’s inclusion is that a committee member’s cosponsorship is more naturally sought after, 
both since committee members are more likely to be subject-matter experts and because their 
support is needed for the sponsor to get their bill reported out of committee (Koger 2003). 
 I incorporate more legislator characteristics as controls. Seniority, measured per Congress 
rather than per year, comes from Fowler’s dataset for the 98th through 108th Congresses, and 
from the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress for the 109th Congress onward. 
Ideology data derives from VoteView (Lewis et al. 2021), and only the economic dimension of 
the NOMINATE score is used for the sake of simplicity. Finally, I add a proxy control to 
account for the legislator’s individual general level of cosponsorship activity, 
totalnumcosponsored, by tallying how many cosponsorships on “important” bills they had within 
a session, and replicating that number across all of the legislator’s entries within that session. It 
should be noted again that both this variable and the totalbillcosponsors variable pose a risk of 
circularity, as an entry of cosponsor = 1 will automatically increase the number of 
cosponsorships the person undertakes or the bill receives. However, cosponsorship happens at 
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such a large scale and the sample is so large that this risk is negligible in comparison to these 
metrics’ benefits as proxies for a legislator’s activity or a bill’s popularity. 
 Finally, identifiers are assigned to a legislator per session (under a variable called 
personsession) for the purposes of clustering standard errors, given the other unobserved 
autocorrelations among the same individual’s actions during a session. 
 
 All regressions R1-R4 are probit in form, with errors clustered on personsession, and the 
probit results are used to calculate corresponding average marginal effects. R1 and R3 use the 
more fine-grained ideological score nominate_dim1 while R2 and R4 use a simpler sameparty 
categorical variable in order to get a sense of the size of the effect same-party status has on 
cosponsorship. R1 and R3 should be relied on more directly for precise information about the 
other effects; only sameparty should ultimately be drawn only from R2 and R4 (c.f. Talbert and 
Potoski 2002). R3 and R4 are more sophisticated and incorporate more control variables about 
productivity, including the total number of bills a legislator has cosponsored in a session and the 
total number of sponsorships the bill’s sponsor has undertaken within a session; they also use 
totalbillcosponsors as a proxy for an individual bill’s popularity. Meanwhile, R1 and R2 only 
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control for ideological and situational factors, but they also do not bear any of the additional 
risks posed by the circularity, even though those risks appear to be negligible. 
 After the main body of regression analyses, I undertake a difference-in-difference-in-
differences analysis to evaluate H2, the hypothesis related to causality. As a within-subjects 
quasi-experimental approach, it is an appropriate methodology to estimate causality in this 
situation. Other quasi-experiments are not feasible in this case: there are no eligible instrumental 
variables, for example, that could be used to approximate a causal finding. A valid difference-in-
differences sample where legislators have records pre- and post-treatment only exists for the D 
Street group, however, where Durbin and Gejdenson served in Congress prior to joining the 
residence with Schumer and Miller.10 As such, it is also a weaker sample than one might like, 
especially because both were regular dinner guests prior to moving in (Kane 2015b; Gejdenson 
2021), blurring the idea of a “treatment.” First, I adapt R3 to use both roommate-sponsored bills 
and non-roommate-sponsored bills; then, I use it to calculate difference-in-difference values 
between the treated group (Gejdenson and Durbin) and the untreated group (all other members of 
the House), run separately on samples of non-roommate-sponsored bills and those bills 
sponsored by the remaining two D Street roommates. Finally, I take the difference of those 
difference-in-differences. As stated in the hypotheses section, if Durbin and Gejdenson 
experience a significant increase in roommate-bill cosponsorship relative to non-roommate bills 
after controlling for all exogenous trends, then a directly quantifiable causal relationship between 
roommate status and roommate cosponsorship can be determined. 
 
10 Durbin’s tenure began in the 98th Congress and Gejdenson’s began in the 97th Congress. 
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3.2 Results – D Street House, Periods 1 and 2 
The D Street residence’s data is split into two sections due to Durbin’s and Schumer’s 
accessions to the Senate in 1997 and 1999 respectively. Since inter-chamber collaboration cannot 
be tracked quantitatively through cosponsorship data, which is an intra-chamber metric, the first 
period being more representative since all roommates were in the House of Representatives. On 
top of that, since there are only two roommates tracked at a time in most of the second period, 
Period 2’s results may be more variable and less representative, depending more directly on the 
rate of a roommate’s bill sponsorship, for example, or direct interpersonal relationships between 
the two individuals rather than a more generalizable “roommate effect.” Period 1 lasts from 
1983, at the beginning of the 98th Congress, through 1997, at the end of the 104th Congress. 
Period 2 lasts from 1997, when the 105th Congress began and Durbin entered the Senate, until 
2015, when the 113th Congress came to a close and the residence dissolved. 
 
Summary Statistics 
 The summary statistics provide prima facie evidence that is already tentatively supportive 
of H1 (roommate correlation) and H3 (ideological and partisan influences). Table 1 counts 
instances of cosponsorship among all bill-action observations for roommate-sponsored bills in 
the period. The first section, “All,” includes the whole chamber’s actions on these bills, the 
second section isolates just Democrats’ actions, and the third refines that further to just the 
actions of Democrats sitting on a relevant committee. Table 2 applies basic t-tests to the 
differences between the roommates and their non-roommate counterparts in those three groups. 
Compared to other Democrats in Period 1, the roommates were more likely to cosponsor a piece 
of legislation sponsored by a fellow member of the D Street residence by about two percentage 
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points, and the difference was statistically significant. However, they were also likely to be more 
senior than members of their party and more liberal than the average Democrat, hence the need 
for more thorough regression analysis to break apart the influences of different covariates. This 
difficulty becomes even more apparent with the narrowest grouping, where members are both on 
a relevant committee and in the same party. In Period 1, the difference between roommates and 
non-roommates in this group is insignificant, but that seems to be mostly due to insufficient 
observations.  
Tables 3 and 4 are analogous to Tables 1 and 2 for Period 2. Interestingly, while the 
magnitude of the difference in cosponsorship activity is roughly the same at around two 
percentage points, the difference is no longer statistically significant, possibly due to fewer 
observations and an apparent increase in all cosponsorship activity on roommate bills during this 
period. The committee-member group results are also odd: the difference is actually significantly 
tilted toward non-roommates, either a very surprising finding or, more realistically, an issue with 
the small sample of only two roommates in the House in that period. These difficulties presage a 





Figures 3 and 4 plot the mean of cosponsorship activity for roommates and non-
roommates on roommate-sponsored bills across individual congressional sessions. First, there is 
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a significant degree of variation across different sessions. There is also a much wider amount of 
variance in the second period relative to the first, regardless of roommate status. In Period 1, 
there is a clear trend toward higher rates of cosponsorship by roommates, consistent with H1. In 
Period 2, that trend is much weaker if it even exists at all, undermining that support for H1. 
 
Figures 3 and 4 
 
 
Regressions 1 and 2 
 R1 and R2 in both periods align with secondary hypothesis H3 (ideological and partisan 
influences), do not support H6 (minority party status influence), and offer weak signals regarding 
primary hypothesis H1 (roommate correlation) and secondary hypothesis H5 (seniority 
influence). Examining the secondary hypotheses first, the regressions confirm that ideology has a 
very strong association with cosponsorship, as one might expect.11 However, both regressions 
find that cosponsorship is more likely when the sponsor is in the majority rather than the 
 
11 The coefficient’s value is negative because the liberal dimension of a NOMINATE score lies along the domain (-
1, 0). 
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minority, a violation of the conditions assumed by H6. As for H5, Period 1 bears out the 
expected result of seniority having a small and negative incremental effect on cosponsorship 
activity; however, Period 2 does not produce a significant result. Additionally, both have 
particularly low pseudo R-squared values, indicating that the models are a relatively poor fit for 
the dataset. These disconfirmations are all challenges to external validity, indicating that the R1 
and R2 results, especially the Period 2 results, may not be representative of real-world 
conditions. 
 The two divergent periods present a similar dilemma for the primary hypothesis H1 and 
the effect of the roommate = 1 condition. Period 1 features a significant (p < 0.05) marginal 
increase of about one percentage point on the likelihood of cosponsorship, but Period 2’s effect 
is null. Even more oddly, the interaction term incommitteeXroommate, which is statistically 
significant in Period 2 but neither individually nor jointly significant in Period 1, bears a sharply 
negative effect to the tune of six percentage points. This is possibly a quirk resulting from the 
small number of datapoints available in period 2 after only two D Street residents remained in 
the House of Representatives. However, there is another potential explanation. Since 
incommitteeXroommate is an interaction term, its marginal effect should be summed with 
incommittee and roommate. Interestingly, incommitteeXroommate has the effect of essentially 
negating incommittee’s impact on net, suggesting that committee membership and roommate 
status are something akin to substitutes when it comes to producing collaboration, rather than 
complements. This phenomenon happens more robustly in R3 for the second period, and it 
happens again in the R3 done on the Shimkus group, albeit slightly more weakly. The 
implication is that there may be diminishing returns to the frequency with which legislators 




   
 
Regressions 3 and 4 
 With the addition of extra controls for a legislator’s productivity and a bill’s popularity, 
the effects of roommate status on cosponsorship of roommates’ bills became more pronounced, 
indicating more robust support for H1 (roommate correlation). Importantly, this time, H6 
(minority party status influence) is supported in addition to H3 (ideological and partisan 
influences) and H5 (seniority influence), with majority status being associated negatively with 
cosponsorship rather than positively. H4 (productivity influence) is also not violated, though 
support is weaker. The pseudo R-squared values are also much higher than in regressions R1 and 
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R2. Together, these suggest that the new controls, while they posed small circularity risks, may 
make R3 and R4 more faithful to reality than R1 and R2.  
The effects associated with the productivity and popularity controls are intriguing;12 as 
one might expect, there appears to be a bandwagoning effect for popular bills (c.f. R. K. Wilson 
and Young 1997), but the more prolific a bill sponsor is, the less likely a legislator is to 
cosponsor any of that sponsor’s bills. This is not necessarily disqualifying of H4, since the 
negative effect is small and the other effects are positive as expected; there may be a degree of 
collinearity between the three measures, as well. Alternatively, greater numbers of sponsorships 
can also reflect failed initiatives, as legislators will occasionally reintroduce their legislation as a 
new bill in the same session if they feel they need to revitalize interest in the subject matter. 
 Support for primary hypothesis H1 is stronger here as well after the addition of these 
further controls. The coefficient of roommate status increased its average marginal effect by 
about half a percentage point, and it became weakly significant (p < 0.1) in Period 2, rather than 
insignificant. Nevertheless, Period 2 remains relatively spurious compared to Period 1, and its 
results should be interpreted cautiously, including the weak finding about the interaction between 
incommittee and roommate as discussed above. For example, the average marginal effect of 
sameparty in R4 is shockingly high, at 15 percentage points. This is a substantial outlier. While 
one might hypothesize that this is a result of polarization, the same effect is not found among the 
Republicans in the Shimkus house, which should have experienced polarization more strongly 










The marginal effects derived from the regression results of R3 and R4 in Period 1 are more 
easily visualized in the following figures. Figure 5 holistically depicts the average differences in 
cosponsorship rates between roommates and non-roommates on a scatter plot. The sample is 
limited to those within the same party, with all other marginal effects (ideology, seniority, 
productivity, bill popularity, committee membership, etc.) held at their averages within that 
subpopulation; the relatively wide difference in cosponsorship between the two groups is readily 
visible, even though the image is something of an oversimplification if we assume there are 
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correlations between ideology and roommate status, for example. Figure 6 represents the 
increase in probability of cosponsorship associated with being on a relevant committee, split 
between roommates and non-roommates within the same party. Again, all other marginal effects 
are held at their averages, making this another simplified image; the important takeaway from 
this graph is that roommates appear to experience increased cosponsorship irrespective of 
committee membership. Figure 7 is a particularly useful graph as it tracks the marginal effect of 
ideology on cosponsorship, simultaneously demonstrating support for H1 (roommate status) and 
H3 (ideological influences). The D Street group was largely a center-left household (Delahunt 
2021; Gejdenson 2021; Marsh 2002), with an average ideological score of approximately -0.360 
in the first period (-0.376 over both periods). Rates of cosponsorship increase exponentially, 
though, as the ideological score approaches -1, so the effect of extremism appears to dominate 
that of proximity. There are a number of proposed explanations for this, including generally 
greater legislative activism by more radical members of Congress, for example (Bratton and 
Rouse 2011; D. Kessler and Krehbiel 1996; R. K. Wilson and Young 1997). Nevertheless, the 
important finding is that roommate status produces a consistent marginal increase on the rate of 
cosponsorship, regardless of ideological difference. In fact, that margin appears to increase at the 
ideological extremity, though that is only an extrapolation using the relatively limited sample of 
roommates. (As usual, other marginal effects like seniority and committee membership are held 
at their averages.) Finally, Figure 8 illustrates the magnitudes of the effects of different 
categorical variables from R4, for the sake of visually comparing the effects of roommate status 
and committee membership with the average effect of co-partisanship. Continuous variables like 
those that involve productivity and bill popularity are held at averages. The relative magnitude of 
the effect associated with roommate status is particularly impressive here.  
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Figures 5 – 8 
 
Analogous graphs are available for Period 2; they are similar in form but lack statistical 
significance and are generally more difficult to interpret, so they are not reproduced here in order 
to save space. Comprehensive sets of all graphs and tables can be found in the appendix. 
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3.3 Results – The Shimkus House 
Analysis of this Republican group is easier as all members only served in the House, and 
therefore only requires analysis within a single period: the beginning of the 108th Congress in 
2003 through the end of the 114th Congress in 2017, when data from this crawl is no longer 
available. Given the anomalies presented by the Trump presidency, perhaps that is for the best, 
so that this case study can be more neatly compared to the group of Democrats. Later researchers 




As was the case in the D Street group’s more robust first period, the summary statistics in 
Tables 9 and 10 indicate that the Shimkus roommates were more likely to cosponsor legislation 
sponsored by one of their own co-residents than the average member of their party, tentatively 
providing further support for H1. In this case, that difference was about two and a half 
percentage points, slightly higher than was the case in D Street, albeit slightly less significant as 
well. Just as in D Street’s second period, this may be due to the smaller sample size: just 284 
salient bills were sponsored by their group from 2003-2017. This is despite the residents’ being 
more senior than the average Republican. However, the Shimkus roommates were also more 
conservative than the average Republican and more likely to serve on committees relevant to the 
bills being introduced. The latter is not necessarily surprising, as the sample consists of the 
roommates’ own bills, which would generally be tailored to the committees the roommates 
served on—but this difference was not significant in either D Street sample. Additionally, the 
qualitative investigation found a greater degree of committee collaboration happening in this 
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household between, for example, Brady and Paulsen on Ways and Means or Shimkus and Scalise 
on Energy and Commerce. Either way, both are rival explanations for increased cosponsorship 
behavior on these selected bills, hence the need for deeper regression analysis. 
 
Figure 9 also plots the mean cosponsorship rates per congressional session, again split 
between roommates and non-roommates and limited only to members of the roommates’ party, 
i.e. Republicans. Its results are an interesting blend of the findings the characterized D Street’s 
first and second periods. Its variance is only slightly greater than that of the D Street’s first 
period, but its loose pattern resembles that of D Street’s second period.  
The leap in cosponsorship activity starting in the 111th Congress is particularly notable 
with respect to H6’s prediction that minority party status increases cosponsorship activity; given 
the large jump that coincides with the rise of a Democratic trifecta in the 2009-2011 session, that 
hypothesis seems robustly supported—at least, at a prima facie level. If H6 is not supported in 






Regressions 1 and 2 
The results of R1 and R2 in the Shimkus sample are similar to the results of the D Street 
group, but they are generally more significant and stronger. Roommate status, in support of H1, 
is associated with a 2.3-percentage point increase in the likelihood of cosponsorship, a one-
percentage point increase from R1’s result in D Street’s first period. Once again, ideology has a 
strong effect in accordance with H3. Seniority has the consistent negative effect predicted by H5. 
H6 (minority party status influence) is again undermined by an apparent positive association 
with the sponsorinmajority variable, though. This is an external validity risk, especially 
considering the minority-party pattern that appears in Figure 9. The danger is also highlighted by 




Regressions 3 and 4 
 R3 and R4 echo R1 and R2, with roommate status once again bearing a slightly higher 
increase in cosponsorship rates on roommate-sponsored bills now that the productivity and 
popularity controls are included, again in support of H1 (roommate status correlation). 
Specifically, roommate status is associated with a 2.5-percentage-point increase in the likelihood 
of cosponsorship, a 0.8-percentage point increase over the magnitude of the effect in the D Street 
group. It is equivalent in magnitude to approximately 40% of the effect associated with 
sameparty—again, this is surprisingly large. As in D Street’s second period, the interaction term 
incommitteeXroommate has become weakly significant and negative in R3. Perhaps this should 
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be read as a more realistic manifestation of that result: a slight dilution of both of the strong 
effects from roommate and incommittee is intuitive, per the analysis in the D Street section.  
The effects associated with the added control variables provide a qualified affirmation of 
H4 (productivity influence), consistent with their effect in the D Street sample: the level of 
cosponsorship activity is positive and statistically significant but small, and the bill’s popularity 
corresponds with a positive bandwagoning effect. However, a sponsor’s total sponsorships are 
still negatively associated with the chance of cosponsoring one of their bills, which remains a 
peculiar finding. As usual, though, ideology is the strongest factor, supportive of H3.13 With the 
added controls, the sponsorinmajority variable changed substantially, and it now bears the 
negative effect posited by H6 (minority party status influence). Once more, the improved 
compatibility with the secondary hypotheses is evidence that R3 and R4 are a higher-fidelity 
model than R1 and R2; this is supported by the pseudo R-squared values as well, which are again 
much greater in R3 and R4, indicating that they fit the data significantly better than do R1 and 
R2. 
 
13 The coefficient’s value is now positive because the conservative dimension of a NOMINATE score lies along the 




The marginal effects can be visualized with the following charts, analogous to those 
presented in the D Street section. Similarly, the trends are consistent with those in the graphs 
from D Street’s first period. Figure 10 plots the different cumulative rates of cosponsorship for 
roommates and non-roommate co-partisans, with other variables held at their average marginal 
effects. As before, this difference is statistically significant. Figure 11 traces the effect of 
roommate status alongside committee membership (all other marginal effects at average), and 
Figure 12 compares the effect of roommate status alongside the average rates associated with 
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ideology scores. The pattern is the reverse of the D Street graph because this is the opposite end 
of the ideological spectrum; however, the rate of cosponsorship among co-partisans is also 
greater across the board here, by about a percentage point. The mean ideological score of the 
group is 0.468, somewhat more extreme than the D Street group, but also with less variance. The 
different effects of ideological proximity and ideological extremism (with extremism apparently 
dominating) are visible again, as well. Nevertheless, for both of these figures, the significance is 
weaker in this instance than in the analogous graphs from D Street’s first period. The distances 
between the means are similar, and I would tentatively posit that the weak significance is 
primarily a result of a smaller sample size. Nevertheless, Figures 11 and 12 are therefore not the 
same robust support for H1 (roommate status correlation) that Figures 6 and 7 were, though 
Figure 11 still aligns with H3 (ideological influences).  
Meanwhile, Figure 13 depicts an array of statistically significant categorical variables 
that support H1, H3, and H6 (minority status influence). Note also that the sameparty effect as 
well as the incommittee effect are both significantly greater than they were in the D Street 
sample, which is intriguing. However, there may be collinearity between sponsorinmajority and 
sameparty across both case studies, and this might account for some of these disparities. 
Importantly, in both samples, there is no statistically significant difference between the 
magnitudes of the effects of incommittee and roommate.  
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Figures 10 – 13 
 
3.4 Results – Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences  
The question of causality, represented by H2, remains unresolved thus far in the analysis, 
as it has focused on correlational relationships thus far. The difference-in-difference-in-
differences (DDD) quasi-experimental investigation can therefore hopefully provide an answer 
to that question should a statistically significant result be obtained. There are three possible 
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outcomes: if, after controlling for exogenous trends, the differences in cosponsorship behavior 
between roommate and non-roommate sponsors significantly increase when legislators join the 
shared residence, then we can conclude that roommate status is likely the cause of increased 
collaboration between the roommates. If that marginal increase is positive but substantially 
smaller than the typical correlation associated with roommate status in the above regressions, 
then there is likely a causal relation that is being diluted by self-selection or other unexplained 
variables. Finally, if there is no significant change in behavior after the “treatment” (joining the 
household), a causal relation cannot be attributed quantitatively, prompting greater reliance on 
the qualitative insights from Chapter 2 instead. 
In this case, the quasi-experiment is as follows: Representatives Sam Gejdenson and Dick 
Durbin had careers in the House both prior to joining the D Street residence (pre-treatment) and 
during their time in the D Street residence (post-treatment). They are the only two legislators 
from either sample for whom this is true; all others entered their shared residence relatively soon 
after joining Congress. The goal is to test for a change in the disparity between their 
cosponsorship behavior toward roommates and non-roommates after they joined the residence; 
ostensibly, an expected result would be an increased divergence between the two groups, 
indicating a greater preference for their new roommates. To measure this, their post-treatment 
rate of cosponsorship is first subtracted from their pre-treatment rate of cosponsorship, after 
controlling for general trends across the time period. This is done separately for non-roommate-
sponsored bills (within their own party) and roommate-sponsored bills. Then, those treatment 
effects (the difference-in-difference results) are subtracted from one another to determine 
whether they are of significantly different magnitudes. If there is a larger post-treatment increase 
in roommate-based cosponsorship than non-roommate-based cosponsorship, then we can fairly 
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say that the treatment was biased toward roommates and attribute causality that way. Other 
results would produce different conclusions, of course, but lastly it is important to note that an 
insignificant result does not necessarily prove that there is no causality relation; while that is 
possible, it may also mean that the quantitative analysis is insufficiently equipped to answer the 
question. This is particularly likely to be the case in this scenario, because the sample of 
Gejdenson and Durbin is simultaneously small and biased: both regularly had dinner with the D 
Street group, as they were all part of a small social group of tight-knit center-left legislators that 
also included Reps. Nancy Pelosi and Anna Eshoo (Gejdenson 2021; G. Kessler 2019). That 
strong social tie and regular informal interaction may be a strong substitute for a roommate 
relationship, perhaps dampening the relative effect of actually joining the household 
First, Figures 14 – 16 are simple linear graphs that depict the average cosponsorship 
behavior of the treated group (Gejdenson and Durbin) and all other Democrats over time.  
Durbin and Gejdenson both entered the D Street house at the turn of the 103rd Congress. Durbin 
exits the dataset after the 104th Congress upon becoming a senator. Meanwhile, Gejdenson’s last 
term in the House was the 106th Congress. The post-treatment period, therefore, is less extensive 
than one might have hoped. Figure 14 depicts cosponsorship behavior as it relates to roommate-
sponsored bills, Figure 15 does so with bills that are not sponsored by roommates, and Figure 16 
presents both of those sets in one graph for easier comparison. The weakness of this treatment 
group is readily apparent from the high degree of variance and general inconsistency across the 
graphs, and no clear divergence from the non-roommate trend is immediately visible. In fact, it 
seems that Gejdenson and Durbin were already predisposed to working with the roommate 
group. This is later confirmed in the difference-in-difference-in-differences calculations. 
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Figures 14 – 16 
 
Figure 17 plots the results of the empirical difference-in-difference-in-differences 
analysis. I run an adaptation of R3 on the larger dataset of roommate-sponsored and non-
roommate-sponsored bills alike to determine the differences in cosponsorship behavior between 
treated and untreated legislators before and after the treatment (moving into the residence), using 
all of the same covariates as controls (seniority, ideology, bill popularity, legislator productivity, 
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etc.).14 For the most part, it seems that there was very little change in cosponsorship behavior 
across time after implementing those controls. The difference-in-difference is calculated by 
subtracting the first from the third measure in each chart (i.e. treated difference minus untreated 
difference); as you can see, in both sets, the mean difference is already practically nil and the 
difference between those differences is statistically insignificant. In turn, the difference-in-
difference-in-differences is therefore also nil and insignificant.  
I include the second measure in the chart, the before-treatment difference, to explore 
whether the treated legislators were already biased toward the roommates in the first place, 
perhaps because of their pre-existing social ties. Sure enough, there is a statistically significant 
difference between those contrasts in the roommate-sponsor sample and the non-roommate-
sponsor sample, indicating that Durbin and Gejdenson had a pre-treatment preference for the D 
Street roommates already. The direct cause of that preference is uncertain—it could be based in 
policy interests, personality traits, or social ties—but it suggests that this sample may not 
experience a sharply-defined “treatment,” making Durbin and Gejdenson a potentially flawed 




14 I divide personsession clusters by sponsor, creating a personsessionsponsor identifier to better account for 





Table 13 reflects the regression postestimation outputs when these pairwise comparisons 
are conducted altogether in one regression (hence the slightly lower standard errors). Again, this 
is an adapted R3, with covariates listed below. As above, only the initial pre- and post-treatment 
differences are significant; the difference-in-differences and the difference-in-difference-in-
differences are all insignificant. In fact, the ultimate mean difference-in-difference-in-difference 




Ultimately, the results of the main regressions in both case studies offer substantial 
support to primary hypothesis H1, that roommate status is associated with greater cosponsorship. 
This is especially true of the most comprehensive regression, R3, the results of which tend to 
align with H3, H4, H5, and H6 across both the Shimkus group and the D Street group, favorably 
suggesting that those findings are externally valid. The other regressions all had more 
weaknesses: R1 and R2, for example, could not account for bandwagoning and productivity, and 
repeatedly failed to satisfy important secondary hypotheses like H5 and H6. 
According to the regression analysis, a roommate tie is associated with approximately a 
two-percentage point increase in the average rate of cosponsorship. Depending on the sample, 
this effect’s magnitude is equal to about 40 to 54 percent of the magnitude of the effect of co-
partisanship, for example, or approximately equal to the magnitude of the effect associate with 
being on a committee into which the bill is introduced. In fact, a roommate tie alone can 
apparently increase the average rate of cosponsorship on bills by 20 to 25 percent. 
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Such a robust possible effect is exciting, but it must be regarded cautiously given the 
insufficient information to make a determination regarding causality, as referenced in H2. The 
difference-in-difference-in-differences analysis did not find a significant change in the two 
legislators’ behavior after Gejdenson and Durbin moved into the D Street home, but the 
calculation was also hobbled by a poor sample. Reverse causality was laid out as a possible 
problem in Chapter 1; ultimately, this analysis has been unable to assess any direction of 
causality whatsoever—including, for example, bidirectional causality and possible third-variable 
causation. That determination will have to be informed qualitative evidence, instead, and as such 
the question of causation will be discussed holistically in the following chapter. 
4 Conclusions and Implications 
You’re more apt to want to help each other: to give advice, to offer insight… I mean, 
when I look back after being in Congress for ten years, I would have saved a ton of 
money if I had just stayed in my office or lived in my office. But, for me, it's like, I'm 
mentally healthy—a lot more healthy—for not living where I work all day… And then, 
I'm really glad I got to know these guys, because I still stay in touch with them and talk 
to them regularly even now. (Paulsen 2021) 
4.1 Analytical Conclusions and Limitations 
In discussing the results of this thesis, it is especially important to be mindful of the usual 
distinction between correlation and causation. The qualitative section anecdotally supported the 
first hypothesis, which posited a correlation between roommate status and legislative 
collaboration, and strongly supported the second hypothesis, that moving into a shared residence 
was indeed the cause of the increased rate of collaboration among the roommates.  
Roommates from both groups laid out a basic schematic in interviews with me: the focal 
point of their interactions with the group occurred in the shared residence during the late 
evenings, when the roommates would return from the usual dinners and fundraisers to relax, 
watch television, and prepare for the following day. While doing so, of course, they would chat 
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with one another casually about their days, including their ongoing projects. This shared space 
happens to be unique during the Washington workweek, because lawmakers do not typically 
have the opportunity to relax with others in a way that is uninterrupted, long in duration, and 
relatively intimate. The casual, unstructured time enabled the four roommates first to become 
friends, and then to offer one another advice and resources on an ad hoc basis. More senior 
legislators would give more junior roommates tips on winning committee leadership positions, 
for example, or on passing a piece of legislation. Roommates with different networks would 
catch one another up on goings-on elsewhere in Congress, occasionally presenting new 
opportunities to synergize. By and large, the interviewees believed that this information-sharing 
was the most important legislative benefit they received from the arrangement, rather than any 
kind of direct material aid, though they agreed that direct collaboration did happen as a result, as 
well. All three causal mechanisms—proximity, encapsulated self-interest, and altruism—were 
supported in this analysis. As one might suspect, ideological compatibility and district-interest 
compatibility were necessary conditions for material collaboration to occur, and an overlap in 
subject-matter expertise (“issue portfolios”) was a further catalyst for collaboration. Especially 
surprising in the analysis was the strength of support shown by roommates in leadership and 
committee elections, though Paulsen rightly notes that this may be a two-way street: non-
roommate competitors likely feel that their resources are better spent competing for non-
roommates’ votes. Of course, they attributed the greatest importance to the friendships they built, 
and they cited other possible benefits, like improved mental health, for example.  
In terms of implications for the legislative impact, though, this idea of clustered 
information-sharing is perhaps qualitatively different from what I had originally hypothesized; 
however, it makes sense that a marginal increase in direct collaboration would be taking place 
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against a backdrop of indirect assistance. Importantly, this shared increase in productivity 
appears to be novel; in other words, it does not appear to be a redistribution of productivity that 
might have happened with other people had it not happened in the shared residence. Essentially, 
because the cooperation is focused around a unique social environment in the late evenings, it is 
not crowding out other collaboration that happens during the workday among non-roommates. 
The only rival legislative use of this late-night period, typically, would be something like writing 
documents and reading briefings. The roommate group has thus functionally “unlocked” new 
productivity rather than shifting around old productivity. 
If roommate arrangements happened at a wider scale, these qualitative findings could be 
reflected by a kind of cluster network, where each roommate has access (albeit, realistically, 
imperfect access) to the knowledge and resources of their full set of roommates, creating a small 
positive externality for the whole body as the Congress became cumulatively more efficient. At a 
certain critical point, however, it may also be possible that clusters would stop sharing 
information with one another and produce a negative externality; for example, the potent allyship 
of roommates in leadership elections might trigger bad feelings between clusters as they compete 
for finite positions. Alternatively, that allyship could become less potent over time. 
Unfortunately, since there is no data on this phenomenon at a sufficiently large scale, it is 
impossible to test these counterfactuals. 
 The quantitative analysis conducted in Chapter 3, meanwhile, found strong support for 
the first hypothesis (correlation) but no support for the second hypothesis (causation). It 
discovered a roommate peer effect that appears to increase the likelihood of cosponsorship to the 
tune of two percentage points, about half of the magnitude of the increase associated with being 
in the sponsor’s political party, and a substantial finding compared to the 6-8% chance of 
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cosponsoring any one bill sponsored by a co-partisan. This “roommate effect” is also roughly 
equivalent to the increase in the likelihood of cosponsorship associated with being a member of a 
committee into which the bill is introduced, and it is possible that the two affiliations are 
substitutes for one another with respect to socially stimulating peer effects, to a degree. The 
effect is roughly similar in magnitude for members of either party, at least for residences that are 
occupied only by members of a single party. For any number of possible reasons, the effect was 
slightly greater in magnitude for the group of Republicans, by about three-quarters of a 
percentage point.  
However, the second hypothesis—that moving into a shared residence was indeed the 
cause of the increased rate of collaboration among the roommates—is not as easily supported 
quantitatively. This is typical for peer-effects analysis in American legislatures, where true 
randomization of a sample of legislators is not a real possibility (c.f. Dietrich 2020; Rogowski 
and Sinclair 2012; Shalizi and Thomas 2011; Masket 2008; Caldeira and Patterson 1987; versus 
Harmon, Fisman, and Kamenica 2019; Saia 2018). The difference-in-difference-in-difference 
analysis conducted at the end of Chapter 3 found that there was no statistically significant 
difference in the two “treated” legislators’ preferences between D Street roommates and non-
roommate Democrats before and after they moved into the residence. However, the sample was 
also small and weak. In the presence of clear correlational data and the absence of clear 
causational data, we can draw no strong quantified conclusions regarding most aspects of 
causality. Reverse causality is possible, for example: these legislators who chose to room 
together may have had some shared social characteristics not captured by my control variables 
that made them more likely to collaborate with one another anyway. Indeed, two-way causality, 
the combination of both of these directions of causation, is the most likely. Alternatively, a third 
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variable could be a causal factor; for example, the D Street group had a long-running dinner 
series with a number of like-minded legislators (Kane 2015b) that may have stimulated some of 
the collaboration captured by the roommate variable rather than, say, a less-observable dinner-
guest variable. That could make the roommate peer effect in isolation somewhat overstated. This 
would also explain the failure of the difference-in-difference-in-differences result derived from 
Gejdenson’s and Durbin’s transition into the shared residence, as they shifted from the dinner-
guest group into the only-slightly-narrower roommate group. 
Therefore, the answer to the second research question has to rely upon the qualitative 
findings. First, this observed “roommate effect” in the quantitative data derives instead from a 
mixture of several causes, including self-selection, with the shared residency being just one 
cause among them. However, given the unique circumstances of the roommate relationship, the 
magnitude of the impact of shared residency alone may be substantial—it may well even indeed 
be the majority of the effect. The findings from the extensive investigation into encapsulated 
interest, proximity, and altruism as the proposed intermediate mechanisms for an increase in 
collaboration reinforce the probability that there is indeed fertile ground for cooperation being 
created by sharing an informal residential space. Since the available evidence generally indicated 
that trust was being built and utilized by the roommates, that proximity was a factor, that 
encapsulated-interest behavior manifested in instances of collaboration, and that the late-night 
productivity was novel as opposed to redistributed from elsewhere, it is almost impossible that 
the roommate relationship was not a main driver total “roommate effect.” The problem is 
determining precisely just how substantial that contribution is, relative to other drivers. 
Perhaps it is useful to explore the tentative finding that being a roommate of the 
sponsor’s and being on a committee into which the bill is introduced have equivalent and 
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substitutable effects on the odds of a legislator’s cosponsoring a particular bill. It is easy to see 
that being on a relevant committee should increase one’s odds of cosponsoring a bill: the sponsor 
will seek out stakeholders within the committee first because that is the first place the bill will go 
(proximity). The sponsor will also be more naturally drawn to committee members because they 
are more likely to be experts on the particular subject matter, and more likely to be interested in 
taking some credit for the bill’s later passage (encapsulated interest). Finally, it is very likely that 
the sponsor is also a member of the committee in question, so it is also more likely that they have 
developed friendships with members on the committee (social-psychological influences) and 
more likely that members of the committee are interested in supporting them in exchange for a 
favor in the future (encapsulated interest). 
Roommate status occurs through similar circumstances and operates similarly. In joining 
a particular committee, legislators will navigate toward their preferences within a system that 
imposes some limitations on that choice. In joining a shared residence, meanwhile, there is an 
element of self-selection along one’s personality preferences, along with an external limitation in 
that there are only so many open rooms and so many members of Congress looking for 
roommates. Just as being on a relevant committee can still cause a real increase in collaboration 
separate from the impact of self-selection onto that committee, a roommate relationship can 
induce collaboration even separate from the collaboration that might have been induced from 
self-selecting into a group along lines of homophily. Proximity seems to be the font from which 
that augmentation flows, as it both enables more frequent opportunities to collaborate and 
encourages closer friendships, generating a greater degree of altruism. 
Thus, just as one might first seek out a committee member for their policy expertise, one 
might happen upon a roommate first for their advice and input. Two committee members or two 
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roommates alike have the circumstances to more frequently trade favors in a mutually beneficial 
encapsulated interest relationship. Just as two committee members are more likely to have an 
altruistic friendship than your average pair of members of Congress, on account of their frequent 
interactions, so too are two roommates. 
The idea that the two are substitutes is, again, a weaker and more tentative finding in the 
statistical data, but it is quite intuitive, and for that reason serves as an apt illustrative device. 
Congressional caucuses function similarly (c.f. Ringe, Victor, and Carman 2013). Two 
interviewees suggested that a smaller version of this effect may be visible as a product of 
CODEL travel, as well, an interesting prospect for future study (Delahunt 2021; Panetta 2021). 
The point is that any informal, frequent social contact in a smaller, stable group is likely to 
induce a greater degree of collaboration for a number of reasons, even after taking secondary 
considerations like self-selection into account. 
There are some other important limitations of the quantitative study. First and foremost, it 
only includes white male members of the House of Representatives. Seeking to respect 
lawmakers’ privacy, I only selected as case studies those groups who have 1) clearly entertained 
or sought out extensive media attention about their shared living space, and 2) have dissolved 
and are no longer living in one of the houses discussed. These were the only two groups that fit 
the description. Given the shifting demographics of Congress, I hope that this will change soon, 
and that research will be able to include a more diverse slate of lawmakers in similar analysis in 
the future. 
It also only includes shared residences that are each of a singular party. A cross-partisan 
congressional home does exist—namely, the Christian fundamentalist residence on C Street (c.f. 
Roig-Franzia 2009)—but it is not an ideal source for data as there is too much secrecy involved 
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to be able to track its membership reliably, and its residents’ shared religious orientation would 
have to be controlled for with some complicated re-manipulations of the existing data. Cross-
partisan living is worth further exploration, though, as legislators occasionally suggest it as a 
remedy for polarization; the Shimkus house interviewee Paulsen, for example, is a moderate 
Republican who indicated a willingness to engage more with Democrats in social scenarios like 
these.  
Finally, it is very important to note that this case study approach examines two instances 
where groups of legislators chose to be roommates. In other words, these were groups of 
congressmen that both 1) were comfortable living in close quarters with other people and 2) felt 
that they were compatible with the particular group of people they chose to live with. There is no 
guarantee that the same findings would be applicable to groups of roommates who came together 
involuntarily, or to more introverted people who may not even function well with roommates in 
the first place. Indeed, that may not even be likely. In fact, given the impossibility of a full 
observational study with comprehensive information on the entire Congress’s living 
arrangements, there is still not a guarantee that these findings would hold anywhere beyond these 
particular two case studies, even though that conclusion, at least, seems likely. Additionally, the 
“roommate effect” might change under new environmental circumstances, for example reforms 
to congressional campaigns, new legislative procedures, or further increases in polarization. 
However, it does seem to have operated fairly consistently across these samples, which stretch 
all the way back to the early 1980s, and it does not seem to be limited in scope by the “type” of 
legislation, affecting flagship bills and parochial interests alike across many different policy 
subjects. 
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4.2 Prospects for Future Research 
Given these limitations, other researchers might consider looking at state legislatures 
instead for similar effects; that broader search will also turn up more diverse groupings of 
legislators, including both cross-partisan homes as well as groupings including people holding 
different ethnic, racial, and gender identities. There is even at least one cross-partisan marriage at 
the state legislative level (Altimari 2017). Clearly, there is a rich supply of material for peer-
effects analysis, should scholars choose to take it up.  
Analysis with more diverse samples of roommates would be particularly helpful for 
testing different possible implications posed by the contact hypothesis. Interpersonal contact 
between members of different groups—as usually studied between members of different races 
and ethnicities—has long been associated with improved perceptions of those groups on the part 
of the individuals, especially under equal-status, positively-minded, intimate, and cooperative 
conditions (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). However, others have 
recently argued that the contact hypothesis needs further exploration before any definitive 
conclusions can be drawn (Paluck, Green, and Green 2019). Meta-analytic research has also 
shown that it is plausible to extend contact theory beyond race and ethnicity to other types of 
groups (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006, 768), and there have been a small number of applications in 
the world of politics, partisanship, and depolarization. Even imaginary contact has been shown to 
reduce negative attitudes toward political out-groups, for example (Warner and Villamil 2017). 
Roommates that vary across race, gender, and party would be suitable for testing these samples, 
potentially leading to novel conclusions about the contact hypothesis. 
 Contact theory can have two opposite impacts on the structure of roommate 
collaboration. On the one hand, it would expect roommates to collaborate across ideological 
divides between each other at a rate that is divergent from that of their non-roommate colleagues. 
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On the other hand, the contact hypothesis implies that it is possible that intergroup contact 
among roommates will also translate to more cooperation between roommates and out-group 
non-roommates (e.g., that after an ideologue collaborates with a moderate roommate, they may 
be more likely to collaborate with moderate non-roommates in the future), which would then 
narrow the same expected divergence.  
There are other complexities and limitations. More recent research has cautioned that 
partisans may not operate quite like other groups in contact theory: instead, opinions of the 
outgroup are moderated through newly-learned commonalities rather than direct contact and 
empathy, and cooperative scenarios are more limited in their relative usefulness than in other 
circumstances (Wojcieszak and Warner 2020). Other research, centered around differing 
opinions on immigration in Europe, finds asymmetrical outcomes: namely, that right-wing 
partisans, due to a defensive political orientation, are more ideologically constrained than leftists 
in their ability to translate positive contact with a member of the out-group to opinions about the 
outgroup as a whole (Thomsen and Rafiqi 2019). These factors may limit analysis of the contact 
hypothesis in a cross-partisan legislative household. 
Finally, other proxy metrics beyond cosponsorship should be explored quantitatively. 
While cosponsorship is certainly the traditional metric for studying American legislative 
collaboration, it does have its limitations, and there are other equally valid metrics that have 
substantively different manifestations. One particularly promising avenue, pioneered by 
Desmarais et al. (2015), systematically tracks joint press appearances between members of 
Congress as another proxy for collaboration. The network is significantly less partisan than 
cosponsorship behavior, and press events may dynamically reflect more intricate processes of 
collaboration that develop across greater ideological gaps. They can be used to represent the 
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frequency of negotiations, and can signal successes and failures procedurally, as collaborations 
stall or revive (see e.g Kaiser 2013).  
4.3 Policy Discussion 
This paper’s policy implications involve some relatively peripheral proposals compared 
to typical mainstream issues, but two relevant discussions in particular have garnered some focus 
over the past several years: digitizing congressional business (c.f. Zuckerman 2019; Jankowicz 
2020; Cortellessa and Harris 2021; see also Dreier 2001 in the context of 9/11) and inducing 
members of Congress to live together (c.f. Schwedel 2017; Cooper 2018; Ocasio-Cortez 2019b; 
Sasse 2020).  
The most extreme rationale of the former goes along these lines: George Washington’s 
original prescription for an ideal House of Representatives was that a member of Congress would 
represent approximately thirty thousand people (Madison 1787). Today, that would translate to 
some 11,000 representatives, far greater than the physical capacity of Congress and its office 
infrastructure, hence the proposal for a Congress that convenes and operates entirely digitally 
(Zuckerman 2019). After the COVID-19 pandemic introduced telework to many Americans, this 
idea may regain traction in some circles. Others have proposed more limited digitization of 
Congress (Jankowicz 2020; Cortellessa and Harris 2021), for example making hearings and 
briefings function virtually. Clearly, there are a number of trade-offs implied by this proposal, 
most of which are beyond the scope of this thesis. For example, giving Congress the capacity to 
operate virtually would be an important benefit in the event of emergencies and attacks, 
including the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. However, this paper weighs in by introducing a 
very significant cost to the proposal of permanent digitization: limiting or eliminating in-person 
social interactions would likely strip Congress of the collaboration induced by peer effects such 
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as the “roommate effect” analyzed here. Researchers and members of Congress, including 
Panetta, generally agree on the importance of those collegial interactions—going as far to say 
that they are what allow the body to operate—and as such, these proposals to digitize legislators’ 
interactions are unlikely to gain much traction (Dreier 2001; Ringe, Victor, and Carman 2013; 
Esterling, Lazer, and Neblo 2020).  
Indeed, weaker social ties (such as those that may arise from virtual rather than in-person 
interactions) are qualitatively different from strong ties, in that they tend to reinforce macro-
group cohesion and imitative, herd-like behavior while diminishing individual contributions by 
“lower-level” participants; this would possibly focus social power even further around a number 
of well-established “leaders,” ostensibly party leadership or other prominent figures (Granovetter 
1973; Seering, Kraut, and Dabbish 2017; Zhao, Zhang, and Bai 2018). A digital Congress 
therefore may accelerate polarization, which would further cripple American democratic 
responsiveness (c.f. Jacobs and Shapiro 2000). Weak ties among a large group are most useful as 
a means of being exposed to new information and strategies that have been generated by smaller 
strong-tie clusters (Scholz and Wang 2009), and can stimulate creativity (Baer 2010)—just as 
they do today in Congress (c.f. Kaiser 2013). However, the most beneficial arrangement appears 
to be an optimal balance and diversity of weak ties and strong-tie clusters (Baer 2010; Scholz 
and Wang 2009; Watts and Strogatz 1998), which a digital environment is currently not likely to 
produce (consider Elmer, Mepham, and Stadtfeld 2020). A network of legislator-roommate 
clusters would be comparable to this ideal, for example, where strong ties bind the roommates, 
and then weak ties facilitate connections and interactions between the different groups of 
roommates to optimally stimulate productivity. Panetta’s “intelligence network” is again an apt 
illustrative device. 
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Congressional housing, meanwhile, is more widely recognized as a field ripe for salutary 
disruption. Salaries have plateaued while expenses have risen, so many members of Congress 
have difficulties affording rent in the District of Columbia while also supporting their family 
back home (Bloom 2017; Cooper 2018; Swalec 2014, 2018), an issue that has risen to greater 
prominence as Congress diversifies and grapples with its image as a disproportionately wealthy 
body relative to the American population. As a result, increasingly large numbers of 
representatives sleep in their offices, a practice which some lionize (Hirschkorn and Andrews 
2011; Steinhauer 2015), but one which is more typically condemned as unsanitary, unbecoming, 
and potentially unethical (Hawkings 2015; Schultz 2018; Sprunt 2020) in that the members of 
Congress are receiving free lodging from their employer, a benefit which the IRS typically taxes 
as a form of income. 
Some legislators, like former representative Jason Chaffetz of Utah, have proposed a 
housing allowance or subsidy as a solution (Bloom 2017; Sisson 2018). However, increases in 
congressional salaries and benefits are politically toxic, especially in today’s era of perpetually 
dismal congressional approval ratings, so stakeholders across the aisle have recognized that this 
proposal is unlikely to pass unless circumstances change or it is done in a creative way (Freed 
2017; Schultz 2018; Ocasio-Cortez 2019a). Thus, as was the case for the D Street and Shimkus 
roommates, sharing living space is typically the most viable alternative for members to save on 
rent—which is where the conclusions of this thesis become relevant. Since cohabitation appears 
to stimulate new cooperation and productivity, at least in these case studies, it appears that 
members may be able to simultaneously save on rent and accomplish more politically should 
they choose to live together. This is a powerful combination of incentives, and it is ironic that the 
increasing hardship for legislators may stimulate greater productivity. However, since most 
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members on both sides of the aisle believe (with good reason) that it is undesirable for wealth to 
be a barrier to congressional service, they might consider both passing a housing subsidy while 
also encouraging sharing living space at the same time. Alternatively, Congress could 
experiment with maintaining a small number of shared, rentable residences for its members, 
geared toward new members and leased out via some kind of lottery, as one might do in 
university housing, for example. Paulsen agrees with this principle, citing the potential 
difficulties legislators might encounter in establishing an informal arrangement similar to 
Shimkus’s shared townhome: 
The challenge with that is you've got to have someone who has the financial wherewithal 
to at least start the process, right, or to figure out how to put it together. And that can be 
real challenging: in Washington, for instance, especially people you know, they're there 
for two-year periods of time, and you don't know how long they're going to be there, 
right? So that's why I think sort of the dorm option—if you want to call it that—is 
something that should legitimately be considered and talked about. (Paulsen 2021) 
 
This dual rationale might increase the likelihood of passing of a housing allowance in the first 
place, as the subsidy could be smaller if housing is shared—as well as more easily justified as an 
instrument for improving collaboration and productivity. 
As Paulsen notes, other legislators, including Democratic Representative Bennie 
Thompson and Republican Senator Ben Sasse, have proposed a greater commitment to 
cohabitation: creating a dormitory for members of Congress (Garcia 2018; Sasse 2020). 
Theoretically, this would involve a construction or renovation project like converting the old 
congressional page dormitories into a housing option for members of Congress themselves 
(Garcia 2018; Schultz 2018). Not only would this provide members with stable, affordable 
housing, they argue, but it would also create new socialization between representatives that 
would help to moderate polarization and improve bipartisanship. Panetta agreed that this would 
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be an effect of constructing a dorm. Many members of Congress, though, hesitate at the idea (at 
least in public), citing hesitations about the particular arrangement, including a potential security 
risk, and also claiming there would be better uses for taxpayer dollars. For example, one 
Democrat stated that if anything, a dormitory should be used to help interns, not members of 
Congress, and one Republican noted “It might be a breeding ground for something bad,” (Garcia 
2018). Either way, as Delahunt described to me, a dormitory is unlikely to happen because 
nobody is likely to ever be willing to champion it. 
These are fair criticisms, and they prompt another important point. This thesis used a case 
study approach, examining “positive” instances of roommate groupings. In other words, it only 
observed those groups of legislators who voluntarily and successfully came together to live in a 
shared residence. It did not observe groups of legislators who rejected the idea of living with 
other legislators, or who could not find suitable roommates for their tastes. The implication is 
that cohabitation may not be a net stimulator of cooperation and productivity for all legislators, 
even if it seems to do so for some. Any directive to cohabitate, especially the proposal of a 
dormitory, must grapple with this difficulty, and should not establish it as a one-size-fits-all 
solution for everybody. As Gejdenson described it in an interview with me, 
I don't think you can mandate these kinds of things… Whatever works for people: some 
people, at the end of the day, need to be alone, and like that… So, you know, I think it's 
got to be a natural development: you can't force it on people. Some people it works for; 
some people it doesn't work for. And, you know, that's where to leave it. (Gejdenson 
2021) 
 
Gejdenson’s point is well taken. Paulsen makes a similar note above with respect to a “dorm 
option”—a dormitory, if it is created, should be smaller, geared toward new members, and 
optional rather than mandatory or quasi-mandatory. Indeed, this thesis does not demonstrate that 
a universally mandated living arrangement will have universally positive effects, as that was 
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beyond the scope. Representative Ocasio-Cortez, since 2018 arguably the sitting representative 
with the most prominence on the topic of reforming congressional housing, points out a similar 
limitation: any living arrangement has to be compatible with the wide diversity of family 
situations members bring with them to Washington (Ocasio-Cortez 2019b). Some currently live 
in Washington with family members, for example. Would spouses or children live part-time in a 
dorm or shared residence, too? That prospect is unlikely to be appealing, and it would further 
limit the pool of legislators for whom cohabitating would be valuable.  
 The other important fact is that not all combinations of legislators are equally compatible 
as roommates, even if they are comfortable with the idea of sharing living space with a fellow 
legislator. The idea that shared living spaces will blossom into productive cross-partisan 
friendships is a central rationale behind certain dormitory proposals. It may be true, or it may 
not: the question merits further research. For now, both groups in these case studies cited 
ideological compatibility and like-mindedness as important prerequisites to their collaboration 
and friendship. This paper’s conclusions about increased cooperation directly apply only to those 
self-selecting groups; translating them to randomized roommate groupings or cross-partisan 
pairings is therefore apples-to-oranges and may not be appropriate.  
 One could also imagine a converse set of conditions: what would happen if legislators 
were required to live together, but could still select their own roommates? Such an environment 
might resemble the 18th- and 19th-century Congresses, where the only realistic living 
arrangement for members of Congress were large shared boardinghouses that became quasi-
political factions. It is not necessarily a “good” thing that those boardinghouses exerted influence 
as voting blocs; indeed, it is likely that constituents would prefer that their representative’s 
preferences directly reflect their own, rather than subject them to being filetered by an arbitrary 
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smattering of legislators who just happen to sleep next door. While the influence of a large group 
living arrangement is unlikely to be as strong in the modern era, given our diverse and 
voluminous sources of information and vastly larger ecosystem of behavioral influences, it is a 
demonstration of the potential risks increasing cohabitation can pose. This paper did not study 
collaboration normatively, as that is beyond the research’s purview; it only quantified 
cosponsorship decisions and examined different forms that collaboration could take in residential 
situations. In a polarized Congress, for example, there is a risk that certain combinations of 
roommate relationships could redirect collaboration even further toward the extremes of the 
parties rather than across them, accelerating polarization. One of the characteristics of the 
voluntary roommate relationships in the case studies was ideological similarity; if one forced 
more and more members of Congress to cohabitate, they might have to eventually create more 
mismatched groups out of necessity, and this more divergent influence could disproportionately 
redistribute legislative outcomes accordingly. Russo, for example, became more liberal after his 
time in the D Street house (Panetta 2021; c.f. Moberg 1992). Alternatively, it could simply 
diminish the amount of novel collaboration produced in a shared residence—however, both are 
possible, and they pose risks that should be accounted for. 
 The limited applicability of roommate cooperation in turn delimits the appropriate range 
within which to encourage cohabitation. Legislators should not necessarily be required to live 
together, and they should not necessarily be assigned roommates at random. This paper does not 
deal extensively with evidence that is applicable under either condition. However, since I do find 
that voluntary, self-selecting roommate groups stimulate new collaboration, it would be 
appropriate to encourage or facilitate the creation of more such groups. This can theoretically be 
done formally through a resolution or legislation—even alongside a small housing subsidy, or 
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through congressionally-owned rentable housing, for example—but, more realistically for now, 
it would be done informally through the party organizations and networks. For example, a quick 
nudge or some kind of dedicated information exchange managed by leadership staff could all be 
useful resources provided to new members of Congress during the orientation session and again 
for stragglers at the start of the session. More encouragement to find roommates could improve 
the quality of congressional life in other areas, too. Namely, if the Speaker of the House 
eventually forbids the practice of sleeping in one’s office, as other Speakers have done in the 
past (Steinhauer 2015), that prohibition would in turn substantially increase the pool of people 
looking for roommates, and an established roommate-matching infrastructure would in turn 
appease those legislators by lowering the cost of an alternative living arrangement while 
simultaneously improving congressional productivity. The lowering of that cost may even better 
enable the Speaker to promulgate that rule in the first place. 
 Other ideas or systems may be equally plausible; these are just demonstrative suggestions 
of steps lawmakers might take to creatively increase the quantity or quality of legislation coming 
to the floor. The same rationale has been used to generate collaboration among regular social 
meetings set up over a meal, for example—however, the unique features of a “roommate effect” 
appear to be its long duration, relative intimacy, and the lack of business-day interruptions, 
which are not quite covered over the short duration of sharing a meal. Nevertheless, perhaps the 
insignificant difference-in-difference-in-differences result taken from Reps. Gejdenson and 
Durbin implies that their dinners with the group prior to moving in were effective at stimulating 
collaboration. Panetta, Delahunt, and Paulsen agreed that there are other social situations that 
produce similar but smaller effects, such as special events, sports teams, travel, and spending 
time in the congressional gym. If Congress seeks to experimentally test for peer effects, they 
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might do well to try out randomized groupings for a series of meals; this is much more feasible 
than randomized housing assignments. Either way, such a proposition is beyond the direct scope 
of this analysis. 
The relevant analytical conclusions of this investigation remain the same: roommate 
status appears to be associated with an increase in collaboration among those roommates, and 
expectations regarding a particular causal mechanism for that increase are mixed. There is an 
element of self-selection, but the greater opportunities for interaction do appear to stimulate 
novel cooperative productivity among the legislators sharing a home. Some of the novel 
cooperation comes from that simple proximity directly; however, qualitative evidence indicates 
that there are also rational self-interest and altruistic behavioral influences contributing to the 
increase, and that the increased interaction augments these influences as well. These conclusions 
are limited to residential groups of legislators that already have a natural inclination to form, on 
bases like shared values and personality traits, and thus should not be applied to groups assigned 
at random without further research. Therefore, the policy recommendations are narrowly 
tailored: any form of congressionally-maintained housing should probably be nonrandom and 
optional, and each party’s leadership should use its resources to “nudge” cohabitation among 
those legislators who may be predisposed to do have roommates, but just need encouragement or 
help finding a compatible group of people. 
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